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INTRODUCTION
Review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("Federal Circuit") of antidumping and countervailing duty
cases is anomalous in comparison to other areas of the court's
jurisdiction. This anomaly stems not, as some commentators assert,
from the fact that antidumping ("AD")' and countervailing duty
("CVD") 2 cases are reviewed under a so-called mandatory two-tier
system ofjudicial review, but rather, from the redundant standard of
review that has evolved for such cases.
3
1. Dumping occurs when a class of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold
in the United States at less than its fair value, and such activity causes or threatens material
injury to an industry in the United States (or materially retards the establishment thereof). In
such cases, an antidumping duty ("AD") is imposed on the merchandise, in addition to all other
duties imposed, to recover any difference between the normal value and the export price (or
constructed export price). 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994).
2. A countervailing duty ("CVD") is an additional duty placed on merchandise imported
into the United States to offset certain types of subsidies received by foreign producers or
exporters from their governments. See id. § 1671.
S. The term "mandatory" as used to describe two-tier judicial review in this Article does
not imply that all cases are litigated through two levels of judicial review. Rather, the term
means that the appellate court must entertain an appeal, if properly filed. The appellate court
does not have the discretion to choose whether to review a case as, for example, the Supreme
Court does in determining whether to grant a petition for writ of certiorari.
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This Article focuses on the Federal Circuit's review of Title VIV
cases, demonstrating the unique posture of the appellate process and
suggesting possible alternatives to the current system of review. In
Part I, the Article discusses those courts and agencies whose decisions
are reviewed by the Federal Circuit and the standard of review applied
in each instance. That section is followed by an examination in Part
II of the particular standards applied in AD and CVD cases. Next,
also in Part II, the question of the Federal Circuit's role in a two-
tiered review is addressed. The review process for AD and CVD cases
is then compared, in Parts II and III, to other areas of law, including
other areas of international trade and customs law. The conclusion
of the Article summarizes the discussion and enunciates the standard
of review that the authors believe is most appropriate for AD and
CVD appeals.
I. SCOPE OF REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. The Importance of the Standard of Review
Parties appealing the decisions of lower bodies often fail to
appreciate the importance that the standard of review plays in the
decision of the appellate court. It is through the "lens"' of the
standard of review that the appellate court looks at the lower body's
decision to determine whether reversible error has occurred. The
various standards discussed in this Article can result in very different
appellate decisions even if applied to similar legal and factual
situations. Because the standard of review in international trade and
customs cases varies depending on the decision to be reviewed, as well
as on the entity-an administrative body or the lower court that made
the decision-advocates often do not effectively focus their appellate
arguments. An advocate who does not understand the standard of
review applicable to a particular appeal could unwittingly prepare an
argument that is inappropriate and, perhaps, irrelevant to the issue
on appeal. Accordingly, whether the appeal concerns a purely legal
issue, the application of a legal standard to certain facts, or merely a
factual error, the advocate must be certain that the parameters of the
standard of review are appropriately applied. If the standards are
properly understood, the advocate can tailor arguments to influence
4. Throughout this Article, AD and CVD proceedings are also referred to as "Tide VII"
proceedings, in reference to the relevant title of the underlying statute, the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended.
5. See Paul R. Michel, Appellate Advocaq--OneJudge's Point of View, 1 FED. CIR. BJ. 1, 1
(1991).
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the manner in which a standard of review is applied, even if by law
the appellate court must apply a particular standard.
B. The Lower Bodies Reviewed by the Federal Circuit in International
Trade and Customs Cases
In international trade and customs cases, the Federal Circuit
reviews, either directly or indirectly, the decisions and actions of two
federal agencies, three executive branch departments, one federal
court and, under limited circumstances, the President.6 Three
subparagraphs of the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional statute identify
the court's exclusive jurisdiction in such cases.7 The broadest
category is the court's review of final decisions of the United States
Court of International Trade ("CIT").8 In addition, the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review final determinations of the
United States International Trade Commission ("ITC") made under
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.9 Finally, the
Federal Circuit possesses exclusive jurisdiction to review, on questions
of law only, certain findings of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce in
connection with the importation of instruments or apparatus."0
The Federal Circuit's review of CIT decisions is based upon the
lower court's jurisdiction, which covers the following: determinations
of the U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC") and the ITC in AD
and CVD cases,' certain decisions and actions of the U.S. Customs
Service ("Customs"), 2 final determinations of the Secretaries of
Labor and Commerce regarding eligibility for adjustment assistance
under the Trade Act of 1974,'" and certain final determinations of
the Secretary of Treasury. 4 As such, the Federal Circuit effectively
reviews the decisions and actions of these agencies and departments,
albeit indirectly through the CIT, rather than through direct appeals
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
7. I. § 1295(a)(5)-(7).
8. i& § 1295(a)(5). The CIT is located in New York City and is an Article III court, id,
§ 251, of limited subject matterjurisdiction, having all the powers in law and equity of a federal
district court. Id. § 1585. The CIT was established through the Customs Court Act of 1980, as
a successor to the United States Customs Court. Customs CourtAct of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417,
94 Stat. 1727 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a) (6). Section 337 prohibits patent, copyright, trademark, and mask
work infringement and other unfair trade practices with regard to products imported into the
United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1994). Remedies for violations of the statute include, inter
ala, the exclusion of offending goods from the United States. i. § 1337(d).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (7).
11. i. § 1581(c), (f).
12. See id. § 1581(a), (b), (g), (h).
13. Id. § 1581(d).
14. Id. § 1581(e) (relating to country of origin determinations for purposes of Agreement
on Government Procurement); i. § 1581(g) (regarding denial of customs broker licenses).
175319961
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from the agencies and departments. The CIT also has broad residual
jurisdiction regarding actions against the United States in matters
involving the U.S. international trade and customs laws" and
jurisdiction over civil actions commenced by the United States to
recover duties, bonds, or penalties. 6 Appeals to the Federal Circuit
of decisions based upon the CIT's residual jurisdiction may also
implicate the actions of other agencies or departments, or even the
President.17
C. Identification of the Various Standards of Review Applied by the
Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Cases
The Supreme Court has described the inherent difficulty in
defining the terms that are used in denominating the various
standards ofjudicial review:
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford
grounds for certitude but cannot assure certainty of application.
Some scope for judicial discretion in applying the formula can be
avoided only by falsifying the actual process ofjudging or by using
the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. It cannot be too
often repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate reliance
for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high
competence and character and the constant play of an informed
professional critique upon its work.
[Because] the precise way in which courts interfere with agency
findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words, new
formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more
helpful than the old. There are no talismanic words that can avoid
15. See id. § 1581(i) (providing for exclusive CITjurisdiction over any action against United
States that arises out of any U.S. law providing for. (1) import or tonnage revenue; (2) tariffs,
duties, fees, or other taxes on imports for non-revenue purposes; (3) embargoes or other
quantitative restrictions on imports for reasons other than public health or safety;, and (4)
administration and enforcement of matters mentioned throughout § 1581); see also Gregory W.
Carman, Remarks Before the Conference on International Business Practice on Practice Before The United
States Court of International Trade, 2 FED. CuR. B.J. 123, 123 (1992) (givingjudicial perspectives on
ClTjurisdiction under § 1581(i)).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (stating that CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over actions commenced
by United States to recover civil penalties under certain sections of TariffAct of 1930, to recover
bonds relating to importation, and to recover customs duties); id. § 1583 (granting CIT
jurisdiction over any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party action if such claim or action
involves imported merchandise that is subject of CIT action or if such claim or action is to
recover bonds or customs duties relating to such merchandise).
17. SeeAmerican Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239,1247 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (affirming CIT's decision that President has authority to enter into trade agreements
limiting importation into the United States of textiles or textile products).
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the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot escape,
in relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining terms.18
There is a considerable body of scholarly writing that identifies and
attempts to explain the various standards of review applied to agency
action.19 The standard to be applied in any given case can be
dictated by statute or determined by the reviewing court and will vary
depending on whether the issue being reviewed is a question of law
or a question of fact.20 In general, courts of appeal apply one or
more of six standards in their review of agency actions and decisions.
Ranked in order from the strictest scrutiny to the most deferential to
the agency, they are: (1) "de novo;" (2) "in accordance with law;," (3)
"clearly erroneous;" (4) "substantial evidence;" (5) "clear error of
judgment;" and (6) "arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discre-
tion."2' Under rare circumstances, there may be very limited or no
18. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-89 (1951).
19. See, eg., WALTER GELLHORN Er AL, ADMINISTRAnvE LAW 849 (8th ed. 1987)
(characterizing scope of review as "a spectrum"); CHARLES H. KocH, JR., ADMiSrRATWE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 822 (2d ed. 1991) (describing review system as "a continuum"); Roy
A. Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks Before the D.C. Circuit Judicial
Conference Review, 34 FED. BJ. 54,54 (1975). Throughout this Article, the term "agency" is used
to encompass both administrative agencies and executive branch departments (or subdivisions
thereof).
20. See GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 19, at 352 (finding that courts traditionally have
categorized questions presented on review into questions of fact, questions of law, mixed
questions, and judgmental questions).
21. See STEvEN ALAN CHILDREss & MARTHA S. DAviS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REvV
§§ 15.01-.12 (2d ed. 1992) (analyzing various standard of review doctrines). Childress and Davis
have distilled helpful definitions of these standards, as follows:
Under "de novo" review, a court must agree with the decision that has been made. Ik at 15-
3. Unless the court can say that the decision of the agency was "correct," the court will set the
decision aside. Id. De novo review therefore should be viewed as "agreement review." Id.
Next is the "clearly erroneous" review standard. Id. at 15-19. This standard also requires
"agreement" by the reviewing court, but to a lesser extent. Id. at 15-17. Under the clearly
erroneous standard, a court will set aside a determination when it has a "firm conviction" that
a mistake has been made. Id. Childress and Davis note that, unlike de novo review, the clearly
erroneous standard requires at least some deference to be given to the fact-finder. Id. at 15-16.
They also note, however, that the clearly erroneous standard generally is not applicable to review
of agency action, but rather is used in review of fact-finding in bench trials. Id.
The third standard is the "substantial evidence" standard. IK at 15-19. Unlike the preceding
standards, substantial evidence does not require that the court agree with the determination
being reviewed. Id. at 15-22. Instead, the substantial evidence standard suggests that the court
must find that it is highly probable that the decision is correct I& Childress and Davis refer
to the standard as requiring a "reasonableness review" by a court. Under this standard, the
reviewing court grants considerable deference to the agency, with some risk that the agency will
err. Id. at 15-26 to 15-27. Childress and Davis note that courts have a tendency to merge the
substantial evidence standard with the arbitrary and capricious standard in situations where the
reviewing court has difficulty ascertaining the risk that the agency will err. Id.
In a seminal case on administrative law, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971),Justice Marshall established the "clear error ofjudgment" standard. In Overton Park,
the Court held that a reviewing court must consider relevant factors and determine whether
there has been error ofjudgment in finding that the agency decision is arbitrary and capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Id, at 414. Although the label
"clear error ofjudgment" sounds like the clearly erroneous standard, Childress and Davis argue
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review, such as where discretion is vested solely in the Executive
Branch either by Congress or under the Constitution.22
In international trade and customs cases, the Federal Circuit
employs most of the above-referenced standards of review, including
de novo review, review based on whether the agency decision is in
accordance with law, the clearly erroneous standard, the substantial
evidence standard, and the arbitrary and capricious/abuse-of-
discretion standard. These standards are discussed in greater detail
below.23
II. FEDERAL CiRcUrr REVIEW OF AD AND CVD CASES
A. The Standard of Review Currently Enunciated by the Federal Circuit
in Title WI Cases
In reviewing AD and CVD cases, the Federal Circuit (in theory)
applies anew, to the agency determination, the same statutory
standard of review as applied by the CIT.24  This "apply anew"
standard is relevant to both issues of fact and issues of law.2" In
most cases, the underlying statutory standard entails an analysis of
that the clear error ofjudgment standard is more akin to the arbitrary and capricious standard.
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra, at 15-35 to 15-39.
"Arbitrary and capricious" is next, and Childress and Davis describe it as requiring a very high
degree of deference-one that would allow a "possibly" correct decision to go unchecked. Id.
at 15-39.
The "abuse of discretion" standard is broken down into two subparts by Childress and Davis.
The first is similar to arbitrary and capricious in the level of deference required (judgment or
guidance discretion). Id. at 15-51. The second grouping is "true and unguided discretion." I&.
at 15-49. The court will review the agency's process of decision for arbitrariness; the decision itself
is not reviewed. Id. at 15-51.
22. See Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (denying
review of customs classification where executive orders of President were basis for classification).
The court, however, may review presidential action on a very limited basis to determine:
whether the President's action falls within his delegated authority; whether the statutory
language has been properly construed; and whether the President's action conforms with the
relevant procedural requirements. Id. at 795; see also Springfield Indus. Corp. v. United States,
842 F.2d 1284, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that review of agency interpretation on issue
delegated to Executive by Congress is entitled to heightened deference because agency action
is in foreign policy arena); Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578,
1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding alternatively, when President acted for policy reasons, no
requirement that President articulate reasons for disapproval of ITC's proposed § 337 remedy,
but dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction).
23. See infra notes 103-24 and 128-33 and accompanying text (defining standards of review
applicable in Federal Circuit review of Title VII cases).
24. See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see
also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1994) (setting forth statutory standards of review to be applied by
CM; Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 66 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing NEC Elecs.,
Ltd. v. United States, 54 F.3d 736, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1995) to establish 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B)
as basis for determining standard of review applied by CIT to AD determination).
25. Atlantic Sugar, 744 F.2d at 1559 n.10; see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text for
detailed discussion of the case.
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whether the agency determination, finding, or conclusion is "unsup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 6 For certain specifically enumerated types of
determinations,27 however, the standard of review relied upon is
whether the agency decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."28
While the Federal Circuit may theoretically apply these various
standards "anew" to the relevant agency determinations, the reality
and the theory diverge.29 As discussed in detail below, nothing
requires the Federal Circuit to apply to the agency decisions the
statutory standards set forth in § 1516a.1° Therefore, it could be
more troubling if the theoretical standard were strictly adhered to,
because to do so would be to ignore the expertise and reasoned
opinions of the CIT. Accordingly, as this Article suggests, the better
result would be for the Federal Circuit to adopt, dejure and de facto,
a new standard of review for Title VII cases.
1. The types of determinations specifically reviewable by the Federal Circuit
in AD and CVD cases
The CIT (and thus derivatively the Federal Circuit) has exclusive
jurisdiction over actions contesting final determinations and other
reviewable DOC and ITC actions in connection with AD and
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B) (i). Codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a is § 516A of the Tariff
Act of 1930; thus, the short-hand reference is "section 516A." Nevertheless, many parties (and
the courts) refer to the provision as "section 1516a." This Article also will use this latter
reference.
27. See id. §§ 1516a(b) (1) (A), 1516a(b)(1)(B)(ii) (providing for review of negative 1TC
preliminary determinations, DOG determinations not to initiate AD or CVD investigation, ITC
determinations not to review determination based on changed circumstances, and abbreviated
agency final determinations in five-year reviews). The last provision was added to the statute as
part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA). Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994). One of the most significant changes to the U.S. AD and CVD laws resulting from the
URAA was the provision for five-year "sunset" reviews ofoutstandingAD and CVD orders. When
parties either fail to respond or respond inadequately to a notice of initiation of a five-year
review, the ITC or the DOC, as appropriate, may issue a final determination in an abbreviated
time-frame. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI in Uruguay Round Implementing
Legislation H.R. 5110, Statement of Administrative Action 209-10 (1994).
28. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(b) (1) (A), 1516a(b) (1) (B) (ii). The more lenientstatutorystandard
is necessary for these types of determinations because they are particularly fact-specific and
policy-oriented. Such decisions involve the exercise of broad agency discretion in weeding out
cases that have insufficient merit to justify the expenditure of valuable agency resources.
29. See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text (discussing standards of review that
Federal Circuit applies in practice).
30. See infra notes 67-102 and accompanying text (discussing focus of Congress, in text and
legislative history of § 1516a, on trial-court standard of review and corresponding lack of focus
on issue of appellate-court-level standard of review).
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CVD determinations specified in § 1516a." AD and CVD cases are
initiated by the DOC, usually upon the filing of a petition by a U.S.
interested party.3" The party must represent a domestic industry,
allegedly injured by reason of the sale in the United States of unfairly
priced or subsidized imports." The DOC will make a determination
whether to initiate an AD or CVD investigation based on the
information contained in the petition and other readily available
sources.
s4
Both the DOC and the ITC play a role in an initiated AD or CVD
investigation. The ITC determines, on a preliminary5 and a final
basis, whether a U.S. industry is materially injured, or is threatened
with material injury, by reason of unfairly priced or subsidized
imports.
3 6
The DOC's role in a CVD or an AD investigation, respectively, is to
determine whether the imported merchandise receives a
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994) ("The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930.").
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) (specifying requirements for initiation of CVD investigation
based on petition by interested party); id § 1673a(b) (establishing similar petition-based
initiation requirements for AD investigations). Both the CVD and AD statutes provide
mechanisms whereby the DOG can initiate investigations on its own, without a petition first
beingfiled. Seeid. § 1671a(a) (providing for self-initiation of CVD investigations); iaL § 1678a(a)
(setting forth procedures for self-initiation of AD investigations). The DOG, however, rarely has
used its authority to self-initiate AD or CVD investigations.
33. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) (1) (stating that interested party must file CVD petition "on
behalf of an industry"); id. § 1673a(b)(1) (articulating same "on behalf of an industry"
requirement for AD petitions). As a result of U.S. concessions in the Uruguay Round, U.S. law
now requires the DOG to make a determination that the petition'is supported by specific
minimum percentages of other members of the U.S. industry in order to meet the "on behalf
of an industry" requirement. See id § 1671a(c) (4) (specifying DOG determination of industry
support for CVD investigations initiated by petition); id. § 1673a(c)(4) (codifying parallel
requirement for AD investigations initiated by petition).
34. See id. § 1671a(c) (setting forth criteria for DOG determination whether to initiate CVD
investigation based on petition); id § 1673a(c) (establishing similar requirements concerning
initiation of AD investigation based on petition).
35. See id. § 1671b(a) (1) (providing for preliminary ITC CVD injury determination); i&
§ 1673b(a)(1) (providing for preliminary ITC AD injury determination). In a preliminary
investigation, as opposed to a final investigation, the ITC inquires whether there is a"reasonable
indication" of the requisite type of injury. Compare i& §§ 1671b(a) (1), 1673b(a) (1) wilth ih
§§ 1671d(b) (1), 1673d(b) (1) (providing identical language for final CVD and AD determina-
tions, respectively, except for omission of "reasonable indication" proviso).
36. See id. § 1671d(b)(1) (providing for final ITC CVD injury determination); id.
§ 1673d(b)(1) (stipulating parallel AD provision). The ITC also may make an affirmative
preliminary or final determination based on a finding that the establishment of an industry in
the United States is materially retarded by such imports (or a reasonable indication of material
retardation in the case of a preliminary investigation). Id. § 1671b(a) (1) (B) (CVD preliminary
determination); id. § 1671d(b) (1) (B) (CVD final determination); id. § 1673b(a) (1) (B) (AD
preliminary determination); id. § 1673d(b) (1) (B) (AD final determination). Practitioners
generally refer to this three-pronged analysis (material injury, threat thereof, or material
retardation) as an "injury" investigation.
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countervailable subsidy-and if so, how much,'7 or whether the
imported merchandise is being sold at less than fair value (i.e., is
being "dumped") in the United States-and if so, by how much.'
The DOC makes both a preliminary and a final determination on
these issues.39
If the ITC determines there is no material injury to the domestic
industry on either a preliminary or final basis, the investigation
terminates.' If the DOC's final determination as to dumping or
subsidies is negative, or the DOC finds a de minimis countervailable
subsidy or a de minimis dumping margin, the investigation is also
terminated." If both the DOC and the ITC ultimately issue affirma-
tive final determinations, the DOC will publish an AD or CVD order
setting forth the rate of the relevant duty or duties applicable as a
result of the final determinations.'
With respect to determinations in AD and CVD investigations,
section 1516a provides that any of the following agency actions may
be appealed to the CIT: (1) a determination by the DOC not to
initiate an investigation;" (2) a preliminary or final negative injury
determination by the ITC (either of which terminates the investiga-
tion) ;"4 (3) a final negative CVD or AD determination by the DOC
37. See id § 1671(a) (directing DOG to determine whether "the government of a country
or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a
countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind
of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States"
and further directing that if DOG determines in affirmative and 1TC makes affirmative injury
determination, that special duties shall be imposed on such imported merchandise "equal to the
amount of the net countervailable subsidy").
38. See i. § 1673 (stating that if DOG "determines that a class or kind of foreign
merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value" and
ITC makes affirmative injury determination, then special duty shall be imposed on such
merchandise "equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the
constructed export price) for the merchandise").
39. See i. §§ 1671b(b) (1), 1671d(a) (referring to preliminary and final, respectively, GVD
determinations byDOC); i. §§ 1673b(b) (1)(A), 1673d(a) (describingcomparable provision for
preliminary and final, respectively, AD determinations).
40. See id. § 1671b(a) (1) (GVD preliminary determination); id. § 1671d(c) (2) (CVD final
determination); id § 1673b(a) (1) (AD preliminary determination); id. § 1673d(c) (2) (AD final
determination).
41. See i& § 1671d(c) (2) (CVD); i. § 1673d(c) (2) (AD); seealso id. § 1671d(a) (3) (directing
DOG to disregard de minimis subsidy margin for purposes of final determination); i.
§ 1673d(a) (4) (directing DOG to disregard de minimis dumping margin for purposes of final
determination).
42. See id. § 1671d(c) (2) (stating that in CVD case, if DOG and lTC issue affirmative final
determinations, DOG shall issue CVD order in accordance with publication and assessment
provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1671e); i. § 1673d(c) (2) (providing, in event of affirmative final AD
determinations by DOG and ITC, for similar procedure for issuing AD order in accordance with
publication and assessment procedures under 19 U.S.C. § 1673e).
43. Id § 1516a(a) (1) (A).
44. See i. § 1516a(a) (1) (C) (preliminary determination); id. § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (ii) (final
determination).
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(which terminates the investigation), or a portion of a final affirmative
DOG CVD or AD determination that specifically excludes a company
or product;' and (4) a final affirmative determination by the ITC
and/or DOG following publication of the order. 6
Following the publication of an AD or GVD order, upon request,
the DOG may conduct periodic reviews to measure and update the
dumping margin or rate of subsidization, or to determine whether
new circumstances necessitate revocation of the order. 7 The ITC
may also review the order for changed circumstances with regard to
injury. 8 Further, a mandatory five-year review of all orders, by the
DOG and ITG, as well as a review by the ITC of certain CVD orders,
has recently been implemented in order to comply with the United
States' international obligations.49 Under these various provisions,
any of the following final agency decisions may be appealed to the
GIT: (1) final results of a DOG annual review of an AD or CVD
order;" (2) a final determination by the DOG or ITC in a five-year
review;5' (3) a final determination in a changed-circumstance review
or decision by the ITC not to initiate a review;52 (4) an injury
determination issued in compliance with international obligations;13
and (5) a decision by the DOG or ITC to take action to implement
a panel report of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 4
Companies also may seek to clarify the scope of an order to
determine whether imports of similar products that are not identified
specifically in the original order are in fact subject to the order and
the imposition of duties.55 The DOG may also review circumstances
under which imported goods may be circumventing an order by
entering the United States through third countries or by entering as
45. Id. § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (ii).
46. IL § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (i).
47. See id. § 1675(a) (1) (providing for annual administrative reviews); id. § 1675(b) (1) (A)
(providing for changed-circumstance reviews).
48. See id. § 1675(b) (1) (A) (providing for ITC changed-circumstance reviews); id.
§ 1675(b) (2) (specifying injury-related criteria for ITC changed-circumstance reviews).
49. See id- § 1675(c) (1) (A) (providing for 5-year DOG and I sunset reviews); id. § 1675b
(providing for ITC injury reviews of GVD orders that were issued without ITC injury test because
subject country had not acceded to GATT Subsidies Code at time order was issued, but country
since has acceded to Code).
50. Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii).
51. Id.
52. See id. (providing for judicial review of fimal determination in changed-circumstance
review); id. § 1516a(a) (1) (B) (allowing CIT review of I determination not to conduct
changed-circumstance review).
53. See id. § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (viii) (referring to judicial review of final ITC determination in
connection with injury review in GATI" Subsidies Code accession situation parenthetically
described in supra note 49).
54. Id. § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (vii).
55. See id. § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (vi) (providing for review of scope determinations).
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parts to be completed or assembled in the United States.5 6 Determi-
nations regarding the scope of AD or CVD orders or whether
imported merchandise is circumventing an order may be appealed. 7
Under certain circumstances, foreign producers and exporters and
foreign governments may enter into agreements with the DOC,
agreeing to cease subsidization or to counteract the effect of selling
subsidized or unfairly priced goods in the United States."8 If such
an agreement is reached, a CVD or AD investigation will be suspend-
ed, but not terminated. 9 Determinations to suspend investigations
may be appealed.'u These suspension agreements also are subject
to periodic reviews by the DOC and ITC and appealable to the CIT
as such.6'
2. The origins of the enunciated standard of review for Title VI cases
a. The Atlantic Sugar standard
In 1984, in Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States,62 the Federal Circuit
inexplicably and without discussion announced:
The statute specifies that the standard ofjudicial review of a final
ITC material injury determination in an antidumping case is
whether that determination is "unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." We
56. I& § 1677j (directing DOG to modify scope of pre-existing AD or CVD order as
appropriate if DOC determines that circumvention is occurring within meaning of statute).
57. Id § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (vi).
58. See id. § 1671c(b) (providing for CVD suspension agreement whereby government of
subject country or exporters of subject merchandise agree to eliminate or offset all
countervailable subsidies, or to cease exports to United States); id. § 1671c(c) (1) (providing, in
"extraordinary circumstances," for GVD suspension agreementwhereby government or exporters
of subject country provide solution that will "eliminate completely" injurious effect of subject
imports); id. § 1673c(b) (establishing suspension agreement option in AD investigation calling
for exporters of subject merchandise completely to eliminate gap between normal value and
export price, or to cease exports to United States); id. § 1673c(c)(1) (providing option in
"extraordinary circumstances" for AD suspension agreement that will "eliminate completely"
injurious effect of subject imports).
59. Compare id. § 1671c(a) (providing for circumstances under which DOC or 1TC may
terminate CVD investigation upon withdrawal of petition) with id. § 1671c(b)-(c) (providing for
CVD suspension agreements); compare id § 1673c(a) (specifying parallel AD termination-of-
investigation procedures) with id. § 1673c(b)-(c) (permitting AD suspension agreements).
60. Id § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (iv).
61. See id. § 1675(b) (1) (B) (providing for DOC and/or ITC reviews of suspension
agreements); id § 1516a(a) (2) (B) (iii) (allowing judicial review of administrative reviews of
suspension agreements). The CIT also has jurisdiction to review requests for the disclosure
under protective order of business proprietary information submitted on the record. Id.
§ 1677f(c) (2). Similarly, the CIT has jurisdiction to hear appeals arising from the enforcement
of administrative sanctions for violation of a protective order issued under the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA) or the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("FTA").
28 U.S.C. § 1584 (1994).
62. 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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therefore apply the substantial evidence standard in reviewing the
ITC's factual determination that an industry in the United States
was materially injured by reason of Canadian sugar sold in the
United States at less than its fair value.'
The court in Atlantic Sugarfurther declared that "[wie review the [CIT's]
review of an ITC determination by applying anew the statute's express judicial
review standard." This standard was repeatedly cited, without
question, for ten years.' For example, in Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v.
United States, the Federal Circuit stated:
In the appeal before us, we are presented with a situation involving
two-tiered appellate review of agency action which is to be reviewed
on the administrative record under the [substantial-evi-
dence/accordance-with-law] standard. In reviewing the trial court's
affirmance of ITA's dumping duty assessment, we must decide
whether the trial court correctly concluded that ITA's determina-
tion is in accordance with the law and supported by substantial
evidence. As aptly stated in Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States...
with regard to appeals under this statute, "[w]e review that court's
review of an [agency] determination by applying anew the statute's
express judicial review standard."66
It is difficult to discern how the Federal Circuit arrived at the
Atlantic Sugar "review anew" standard.' Section 1516a dictates the
standards of review that "[t]he court" shall apply.' Yet, except for
a few special provisions not relevant to the issue of the standard of
63. Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (footnote
omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B)). Circuit Judges Miller and Smith and Senior
CircuitJudge Cowen heard the case, and CircuitJudge Smith authored the opinion.
64. Id. at 1559 n.10 (emphasis added).
65. A review of the Federal Circuit's decisions from 1984 through 1994 shows that at least
fifteen cases have cited Atlantic Sugar for the applicable standard of review. Two of the more
notable cases are cited at infra note 66.
66. Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565,1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (footnote
omitted) (panel: Nies and Michel, CircuitJudges and Baldwin, Senior CircuitJudge) (authored
by the late Circuit Judge Nies) (the court's reference to "ITA" is to the International Trade
Administration of the DOG, which is the subdivision responsible for AD and GVD cases); see also
Trent Tube Div. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube AB, 975 F.2d 807, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that
Federal Circuit first reviews CIT's order to remand to agency under statutory standard, then
reviews CIT's affirmance of remand determination under same standard) (panel: Michel and
Plager, CircuitJudges and Bennett, Senior CircuitJudge) (authored by CircuitJudge Plager).
67. As discussed below in part III.B.2,just a few months prior to the Atlantic Sugar decision,
CircuitJudge Smith was on a panel that addressed the standard of review in appeals from district
court decisions reviewing the decisions of special masters. The earlier case, Milliken Research
Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which Judge Smith dissented, may
have had some influence on the Atlantic Sugar decision, which Judge Smith authored. See infra
notes 462-64 and accompanying text.
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1994) (stating that "(the court shall hold unlawful any
determination, finding, or conclusion" in certain types of actions that fail specified standard of
review).
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS CASES 1763
review, the only court referenced in § 1516a is the CIT. 9 Thus,
there is no question that the CIT is required to employ the statutory
standards. However, as the Federal Circuit in Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. v. United States ("Suramerica IT) 70 explained, the
§ 1516a statutory requirement does not extend to the Federal Cir-
cuit-nowhere in Title 19 or Title 28 of the U.S. Code is there
mention of what standard of review the Federal Circuit should apply
in reviewing AD and CVD cases.7 '
This lack of statutory directive lies in stark contrast to other areas
of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, where the applicable statute
specifies the standard of review to be used by the Federal Circuit. For
example, in both veterans appeals and appeals from decisions of the
Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), the relevant statutes
mandate the standard of review to be applied by the Federal
Circuit.72 In addition, statutory provisions govern the standards of
review to be applied by the lower bodies as well.73
With respect to Title VII cases emanating from the CIT, however,
Congress did not specify the standard of review to be applied by the
Federal Circuit; Congress has only specified the standard to be
utilized by the CIT. Under accepted canons of statutory construction,
69. See generally id. § 1516a (mentioning no other U.S. courts other than CIT, except for
references to effect of Federal Circuit decisions on liquidation of entries in §§ 1516a(c) (1),
1516a(e) and to constitutional challenges of NAFTA binational panel mechanism in
§ 1516a(g) (4)).
70. 44 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
71. Suramerica de Aleaciones Liaminadas, CA v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 982-83 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Suramerka I]. The court in Suramerica II noted:
Section 1516a(b) (1)-(B) provides that "the court" must apply the statutory standard in
actions brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (2) (1988). Section 1516a(a) (2) addresses
the Court of International Trade's review of certain ITC determinations. Thus "this
court of section 1516a(b) (1)-(B) is the Court of International Trade. Section 1516a
is silent on what standard this court should apply when reviewing a Court of
International Trade decision.
Id.
72. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (1994) (providingforveterans appeals); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1994)
(providing for MSPB appeals). The provision governing veterans appeals states:
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall decide all relevant questions of law,
including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions. The court shall hold
unlawful and set aside any regulation or any interpretation thereof (other than a
determination as to a factual matter) that was relied upon in the decision of the Court
of Veterans Appeals that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit finds to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, (C) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory
right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law.
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (1).
73. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261 (identifying standard of review to be applied by Court of Veterans
Appeals); 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c) (stating standards of review to be followed by MSPB).
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such a dichotomy is meaningful. 4 Because Congress clearly has
indicated the standard of review to be applied by the Federal Circuit
with regard to certain types of cases, in instances where Congress has
not done so, the court should be free to craft a standard that it deems
appropriate.75
Also significant is the fact that, in both veterans and MSPB cases,
the statutorily prescribed standards are not altogether redundant. For
instance, in veterans cases, the Federal Circuit can review and set
aside the Court of Veterans Appeals' determinations only as to
questions of law. 6 As to questions of fact, the Federal Circuit has no
jurisdiction to review the lower court, and hence there is no second
tier of judicial review." Moreover, as to questions of law, both the
lower and the appellate court are bound by separate statutory
standards of review.'8 Thus, even if a redundancy exists in veterans
cases, it has been explicitly mandated by Congress, which is not the
situation in Title VII cases.
b. The relevance of section 516A
A historical analysis of the legislation providing for judicial review
of Title VII cases also fails to shed light on the origins of the Atlantic
74. See United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[C]ongressional
consideration of an issue in one context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes implies
that Congress intends to include that issue only where it has so indicated."); see also Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[When] Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (quoting
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
75. See 2A NORMANJ. SINGRM, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 216-27
(5th ed. 1992) (explaining that doctrine of "expressio unius esl exclusio alterius" means that when
legislature expresses requirements through a list court may assume what is not listed is
excluded).
76. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1).
77. See Albun v. Brown, 9 F.3d 1528, 1529-30 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that Congress
denied Federal Circuit broad scope of review in appeals from Court of Veterans Appeals and
limited court's review to certain statutory, regulatory, and constitutional issues); Fugere v.
Derwinski, 972 F.2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that in decisions of Court of Veterans
Appeals, Federal Circuitjurisdiction does not extend to challenges either to factual determina-
tions or to law as applied to facts of particular case).
78. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (standards of review for Federal Circuit); id. § 7261 (standard of
review for Court of Veterans Appeals). Upon initial examination, it would appear that Congress
has built a certain redundancy into the standards of review that the Federal Circuit and Court
of Veterans Appeals are to apply regarding legal questions. Because a detailed analysis of
veterans cases is beyond the scope of this Article, however, the authors are not in a position to
comment on this issue. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Court of Veterans Appeals is an
Article I court, as distinguished from the CIT, which is an Article III court. See infra note 427
for a discussion of the distinctions between Article I and Article III courts and the relevance of
such distinctions to the review of decisions emanating from both types of courts. Furthermore,
as to questions of law, at least some redundancy seems to be likely in any multi-tiered review
system.
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Sugar standard of review. Such an analysis does, however, reveal a
total dearth of support for the proposition that there was any
congressional expectation that the statutory standards of review set
forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a would be applied by the Federal Circuit or
its predecessor, the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("CCPA")."
A Senate Finance Committee report that accompanied the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 explained the reason for adoption of the
substantial evidence standard for review of Title VII cases:
Section 516A clearly defines the scope and standard of review in
suits challenging antidumping and countervailing duty determina-
tions and orders. Currently, the state of the law in this area is
unclear and conflicting.
Subsection (b) of new section 516A sets forth the standard of
review for those antidumping and countervailing determinations
which will now be reviewable. Under present law, determinations
by the International Trade Commission have been set aside only
where found to be arbitrary or contrary to law. More controversial,
however, is the standard to be applied to determinations by the
Secretary of the Treasury. The Treasury Department has consistent-
ly asserted that antidumping and countervailing duty determina-
tions, unlike traditional value and classification decisions, are not
subject to de novo review. A reading of the two recent countervail-
ing duty decisions in the Customs Court relating to investigations
of float glass from Italy and X-belted radial tires (Michelin) from
Canada indicates that some differences of opinion exist with respect
to the issue.
Section 516A would remove all doubt on whether de novo review
is appropriate by excluding de novo review from consideration as
a standard in antidumping and countervailing duty determinations.
De novo review is both time consuming and duplicative. The
amendments made by Title I of the Trade Agreements Act provide
all parties with greater rights of participation at the administrative
level and increased access to information upon which the decisions
of the administering authority and the International Trade
Commission are based. These changes, along with the new
79. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 36-38
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (creating Federal Circuit from two
predecessor courts, CCPA and appellate division of the U.S. Court of Claims). The appellate-
level U.S. Court of Claims should not be confused with the lower-level court reviewed by the
Federal Circuit, namely the United States Court of Federal Claims, which was formerly known
as the United States Claims Court, and was renamed in 1992. Court of Federal Claims Technical
and Procedural Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902(b), 106 Stat. 4516 (1992). This
Article, when referring to this lower court, uses the names "Court of Federal Claims" and
"Claims Court" interchangeably.
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requirement for a record of the proceeding, have eliminated any
need for de novo review."
Thus, one of the chief reasons that Congress added a standard of
review to the statute was because the Customs Court had been
conducting de novo reviews of Treasury decisions. Indeed, in
enacting the standard, Congress stated that de novo review is "both
time consuming and duplicative." Hence, to the extent that the
Federal Circuit's "review anew" standard is analogous to the CIT's de
novo review of agency determinations, the Federal Circuit arguably is
acting contrary to the legislative purpose of section 516A.
The Federal Circuit's "review anew" standard is analogous to the de
novo standard in that the Federal Circuit duplicates the reviewing
function performed by the lower court. However, it is incorrect to
use the term de novo review interchangeably with the "review anew"
standard. In true de novo review, the appellate court would be free
to substitute its judgment for that of any prior decision-maker.81
Where the Federal Circuit uses the "review anew" standard in Tide VII
cases, as to questions of fact, it does not review de novo the decision
of the agency. Rather, it applies the substantial evidence (or abuse
of discretion) standard of review to the decision of the agency, -as
does the lower court.8 2 Similarly, as to certain questions of law, the
appellate court is not free to substitute its views for that of the
agency.83 Thus, while the Federal Circuit does not substitute freely
its judgment for that of prior decision-makers, it nonetheless applies
the same substantial evidence and in accordance with law tests to the
same agency decision or decisions reviewed by the CIT. In this
manner, the Federal Circuit performs a duplicative function.
Furthermore, the legislative history of section 516A focused on a
dispute between the trial court (the Cust6ms Court) and the agency
(the ITC or Treasury).' Congress intended to remedy the dispute
through the substantial evidence test. Nowhere in the statute or
legislative history is there any discussion of the appellate review
standard. Had Congress intended that section 1516a also apply to the
80. S. REP. No. 249,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 251-52 (1979), r*inted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 881,
637. Prior to 1980, the Department of the Treasury was responsible for those administrative
functions in AD and CVD cases that now reside with the DOG.
81. CHILDRESS & DAvis, supra note 21, § 15.02, at 15-3 (defining de novo review and
explaining that appellate court is not bound by agency decision).
82. See CHILDRESS & DAvIs, supra note 21, §§ 15.04, .08, at 15-20, 15-48 (outlining how
substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards examine judgment of agency).
83. See CHILORESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.02, at 15-15, 15-16.
84. See S. REP. NO. 249, supra note 80, at 244-54, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.CAN. at 630-39
(providing background and explanation for revisions made to § 1516a).
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CCPA, it is both logical and legally sound to assume that somewhere
Congress would have so indicated.
Indeed, the inference drawn from Congress' silence is strengthened
by a review of CCPA decisions prior to enactment of section 1516a.
Not only had the CCPA on several occasions addressed the general
question of standards of review of agency action in AD and CVD
cases, the CCPA also had confronted the specific question of the
appropriate standard of appellate review to be applied by the CCPA.85
Moreover, the CCPA was aware of the controversy regarding the
proper scope of review for Treasury decisions that had arisen because
of differences in the manner in which the Tariff Commission86 and
Treasury conducted AD and CVD investigations. This controversy
obviously affected review by the CCPA, because questions arose as to
whether de novo review by the Customs Court had been proper.'
In fact, during the mid- to late-1970s, leading up to the time that
section 1516a was enacted, the CCPA seemed to be applying several
standards of review in AD and CVD cases.' Yet, with one exception,
none of these standards is found in section 1516a.89 This being the
case, if Congress intended for the CCPA to apply section 1516a, it
would have expressly stated that the CCPA should stop using these
various standards and instead should rely on section 1516a.
As to Treasury decisions, if the Customs Court had conducted a
trial de novo, the CCPA reviewed questions of fact, based on the
record before -the Customs Court, using the clearly erroneous
standard of review."0 If the Customs Court had not conducted a trial
de novo, it appears (in older cases at least) that the CCPA ordinarily
refused to review Treasury's factual decisions.9 ' As to questions of
85. See, e.g., Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (C.C.PA 1973)
(discussing scope of court's review); City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994-96
(C.C.P. 1972) (addressing court's limited power to review Tariff Commission's determina-
tions); Kleberg & Co. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332, 335 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (delineating limits on
court's review of Secretary of Treasury's conclusions).
86. The Tariff Commission was the predecessor to the ITC; the agency was renamed in the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 171(a), 88 Stat. 2009 (1975) (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. § 2231(a) (1994)).
87. SeeASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770,778-80 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (questioning
whether lower court should use de novo review).
88. See, ag., United States v. Watson, 603 F.2d 192, 197 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (struggling with
issue of appropriate standard of review); Imbert Imports, 475 F.2d at 1191 (recognizing that review
is limited but not stating what standard should be used); City Lumber, 457 F.2d at 994 (stating
generally that courts have limited scope of review over Tariff Commission's determinations); see
also infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
89.. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B) (i) (codifying substantial evidence standard for AD and
CVD cases).
90. The CCPA also reviewed the independent question of whether it was appropriate for
the Customs Court to hold a de novo trial. ASG Indus., 610 F.2d at 778-80.
91. See United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.PA 1960).
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law, the CCPA reviewed Treasury decisions de novo. 2 For Tariff
Commission/ITC cases, the CCPA on numerous occasions stated that
its review was very limited. As summarized in City Lumber Co. v. United
States.
[U] nder the Antidumping Act Congress delegated to the Commis-
sion a broad discretionary power to determine whether an industry
is being, or is likely to be, injured by the sale of imports at less than
fair value. The courts have a very limited power of review over the
Commission's determinations. It is not the judicial function to
review or to weigh the evidence before the Commission or to
question the correctness of findings drawn therefrom. Kleberg &
Co. (Inc.) v. United States .... As stated in K/eberg, our review of
determinations of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping
cases does not extend beyond determining whether the Commis-
sion has acted within its delegated authority, has correctly interpret-
ed statutory language, and has correctly applied the law. As
indicated in [ United States v. George S. Bush & Co.], "No question of
law is raised when the exercise of... discretion is challenged.""3
Nevertheless, despite this statement, in City Lumber, as well as in other
cases, the CCPA (as apparently the Customs Court had) went on to
apply the substantial evidence test to the Commission's determina-
tion.94 Presumably, Congress was aware of what standards the CCPA
was applying. Thus, had Congress meant to overrule the CCPA as to
use of these various standards, it seems that somewhere Congress
would have specifically said so. That Congress was silent is significant.
Moreover, as seen from an examination of Imbert Imports, the CCPA
seemed to use the terms arbitrary/discretionary interchangeably with
the substantial evidence standard.9" Because Congress was establish-
ing these two standards as two separate standards, it presumably would
have given some admonition or instruction to the CCPA, if Congress
expected that the CCPA would be applying these two standards.
Under such circumstances, the absence of any specific congressional
reference to the CCPA logically can be viewed as supporting the
proposition that Congress did not expect § 1516a to resolve any issues
with respect to CCPA review of AD and CVD cases.
92. See id. at 781-82 (ruling on law at issue in case but refusing to reevaluate facts).
Although the CCPA did not articulate expressly its use of a de novo standard of review, it
effectively reviewed for itself the legal question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id.
93. 457 F.2d 991, 994 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
94. City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 994, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (indicating
court's application of substantial evidence standard); see also Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United
States, 475 F.2d 1189, 1192 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (applying same standard).
95. Imbert Imports, 475 F.2d at 1192; see also Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 626
F.2d 168, 169-70 (C.C.PA 1980) (discussing interchangeability of both standards).
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Further, the Customs Court Act of 1980 did not substantively
amend section 1516a. 6 Rather, the effect of the Act was that the
CIT was substituted for the Customs Court.9 7 The legislative history
of the Customs Court Act of 1980 thus provides no additional
guidance regarding the standard of review that Congress expected for
the CCPA to apply, other than to present cumulative evidence of the
absence of a link between section 1516a and the CCPA/Federal
Circuit.98
Similarly, the legislative history surrounding the creation of the
Federal Circuit lacks any mention of the standard of review for Title
VII cases.99 Again, this is not surprising because, with regard to such
cases, the Federal Circuit merely assumed the same role played by the
CCPA.'10
Finally, the pre-Atlantic Sugar cases (dating from the 1979-1984
period), are more instructive with respect to the controversy that
preceded enactment of section 1516a than they are as a backdrop for
Atlantic Sugar. Nevertheless, perhaps discernible in those decisions
are the beginnings of what led to the Atlantic Sugar rule. Any
similarity to the Atlantic Sugar rule, however, is incidental, because
these cases do not address specifically the question of what standard
of review should be applied by the appellate court in reviewing the
lower court's review of an agency decision." ' As such, the true
origins of the Atlantic Sugar standard of review remain a mystery.
Moreover, as discussed below, it is debatable whether the Federal
Circuit actually does or should adhere to that standard.0 2
96. See Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, §§ 601(7), 608 (c)-(d), 94 Stat. 1727
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1994)) (redesignating Customs Court as CIT, deleting
criteria used in ruling on injunctions, and adding prior notice requirement).
97. Id §§ 601(7), 608(c).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-21 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN.
3729, 3729-33 (stating that purpose of legislation was to clarify laws governing Customs Court
but not mentioning scope of review).
99. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 11,
11-16 (outlining purpose of bill with respect to appellate review but not mentioning standard
of review).
100. See id. at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 13 (stating that Federal Circuit merges
Court of Claims and CCPA in order to address structural problems); supra note 79 (explaining
how Federal Circuit assumed role of CCPA).
101. See Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 626 F.2d 168 (C.C.PA 1980); ASG
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.PA 1979).
102. See infra notes 138-78 and 213-23 and accompanying text.
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B. The Standard of Review Actually Applied by the Federal Circuit in
Title VII Cases
1. Defining the standards of review
Three standards of review are applicable in Federal Circuit review
of Title VII cases: the arbitrary and capricious/abuse of discretion
standard; the substantial evidence test; and the not-in-accordance-with-
law standard of review." 3 As discussed above, these standards are
best understood with reference to each other and to other standards
of review that are either more or less deferential to the body
reviewed."° Accordingly, while the clearly erroneous standard is not
used in Title VII cases, an understanding of this standard is helpful
to put the other three standards in perspective. Similarly, while de
novo review is not one of the standards set forth in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b), this standard, too, can assist in setting a context for the
other standards. 5 Hence, starting with what is widely viewed as the
most deferential standard,"0 6 the discussion in the following subsec-
tions addresses all of the standards of review utilized by the Federal
Circuit in Title VII and other international trade and customs cases.
a. Arbitrary and capricious/abuse of discretion
The Federal Circuit applies the "arbitrary and capricious/abuse of
discretion" standard in appeals of CIT decisions involving certain ITC
and DOC determinations in AD and CVD cases. 7 The Federal
103. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1994) (stipulating standards of review of agency decisions).
These standards are applied by the CIT initially and, at least in theory, by the Federal Circuit
.anew."
104. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (discussing standards of review generally
and in international trade context in particular).
105. The Federal Circuit applies the clearly erroneous and de novo standards to customs
cases, see infra notes 125-27, 134-37 and accompanying text, which, along with Title VII cases,
comprise a significant portion of the total cases heard by the CIT. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994)
(statingjurisdiction of CIT); Leonard M. Shambon, Accomplishing the Legislative Goalsfor the U.S.
Court of Intenational Trade: More Speed.' More Speed!, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 31 (1990-1991). Also,
de novo review is employed with respect to legal questions in § 337 determinations. See infra
notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
106. See CHILDRESS & DAvIs, supra note 21, at 15-2-3, 15-39-53. But see Michel, supra note 5,
at 4 (characterizing substantial evidence test as most difficult standard for appellant to meet).
107. Under § 1516a(b) (1) (A), DOG decisions not to initiate an AD or a CVD case, ITC
decisions not to conduct a changed-circumstance review, and ITC negative preliminary injury
determinations are subject to this standard. See Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. United States, 35
F.3d 1535,1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying arbitrary and capricious/abuse of discretion standard
to ITC negative preliminary injury determination). Further, abbreviated determinations in the
ITC's new five-year sunset reviews will be subject to this standard. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b) (1) (B) (ii). Cases brought pursuant to the residual jurisdiction of the CIT under 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1994) also are subject to this standard of review in both the CIT and the
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS CASES
Circuit also applies this standard to cases challenging regulations
implemented by an agency."'8 Under this standard of review of
facts, the Federal Circuit's scrutiny is more limited than its review
under the substantial evidence standard. The Federal Circuit has
described this review standard as follows:
[W]e must afr the decision of the CIT... unless we conclude
that the ITC's negative preliminary determination was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. In applying this standard, we must "consider whether the
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment .... Although
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." ' 9
The Supreme Court addressed the arbitrary and capricious/abuse
of discretion standard in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm
Insurance Co.,11 describing four factors to apply: (1) Did the agency
rely on factors that Congress did not intend it to consider?; (2) Did
Federal Circuit. See Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 855 F. Supp. 1306,
1311 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994) (applying standard of review pursuant to Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1994), to Foreign-Trade-Zone Board case).
108. See National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 59 F.3d
1219, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to Treasury
Department's findings in promulgation of interim regulations that allowed consignees to enter
merchandise of value up to $200 without using licensed customs broker); Springfield Indus.
Corp. v. United States, 842 F.2d 1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that as long as regulation
is not "manifestly contrary" to law, court must accept it). Regulations also are reviewed to
determine whether they are a permissible exercise of the agency's authority, are reasonable, and
are subject to normal aids of statutory construction. Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713
F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
109. Texas Crushed Stone Co., 35 F.3d at 1539-40 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)) (citation omitted). One common problem with the
standard is that some courts view the arbitrary and capricious standard as being synonymous with
the substantial evidence test. In particular, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals seems to hold this
belief. See, e.g., Money Station, Inc. v. Board Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 81 F.3d 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (noting that substantial evidence test is specific application of arbitrary and capricious
standard);Jersey Shore Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 37 F.3d 1531, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting
that under arbitrary and capricious standard, court may reverse agency decision only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence); see also CHILDRESS & DAvIs, supra note 21, § 15.07, at 1542
n.24. One of the Federal Circuit's predecessors, the CCPA, also appears to have considered
these standards as being similar. SeeArmstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 626 F.2d 168,
169-70 (C.C.P.A. 1980). Given the explicit language of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1), however, which
draws a distinction between "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion," on the one hand(paragraphs (A) and (B) (ii)), and "unsupported by substantial evidence" on the other hand
(paragraph (B) (i)), there can be no question that, at least as to Title VII cases, the two
standards are meant to be different. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has observed that the
arbitrary and capricious standard is more lenient than substantial evidence review. American
Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402,412 n.7 (1983) (holding that
appellate court should have scrutinized agency decision under arbitrary-capricious standard,
which it characterized as "more lenient").
110. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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the agency entirely fail to consider an important aspect of the
problem?; (3) Does the agency's explanation of its decision run
counter to the evidence that was before it?; and (4) Is the agency's
decision so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise (that is, was there a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made)?'
While the label "arbitrary and capricious/abuse of discretion"
suggests three disjunctive elements to one single test, the abuse-of-
discretion phrase is sometimes viewed as a separate standard,
particularly in Title VII cases.' The Federal Circuit has applied the
abuse-of-discretion standard alone, in reviewing decisions of the
CIT,"' as well as agency action subject to review by the CIT."4
Further, the Federal Circuit applies the abuse-of-discretion standard
in reviewing ITC determinations regarding temporary relief in section
337 investigations." 5
111. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Professors
Childress and Davis argue that, when the arbitrary and capricious standard is used,
the court reviews the agency's justification of its decision to determine whether the
decision is rational, not contrary to the available evidence, and takes into account what
should be considered. If, given what the agency should consider, the explanation
demonstrates a reasonable connection between the evidence and the choice made, the
action is sustained.
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.07, at 15-43 to 15-44.
112. SeeCHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.01, at 15-11 (previewing contents of chapter
and separating discussions of arbitrary and capricious standard from abuse of discretion
standard). According to Professors Childress and Davis, abuse of discretion review looks for
three things: (1) consideration of all the relevantfactors (derived from Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 402); (2) rationality, defined as a decision that is not so "implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view" (developed from Motor VehideMfrs. Assn, 463 U.S.
at 29); and (3) that the decision rationally connects the evidence, the legal interpretations of
the agency, and the choice that was made. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.08, at 15-53.
113. See Belton Indus., Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 756, 760 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reviewing
decision of CIT denying party's motion to intervene).
114. NEC Home Elecs., Ltd. v. United States, 54 F.3d 736, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that
DOG's allocation of burden on respondents was abuse of discretion).
115. Rosemount, Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n, 910 F.2d 819, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
ITC determinations regarding temporary relief are required by statute to parallel the standards
relied on by federal district courts in issuing preliminary injunctions. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (3)
(1994); see Certain Circuit Board Testers, USITG Pub. 2622, Inv. No. 337-TA-342 (Mar. 1993)
(temporary relief decision) (citing Certain Pressure Transmitters, USITC Pub. 2392, Inv. No.
337-TA-304 (Mar. 1990) (temporary relief decision), affld sub noma. Rosemount, Inc. v.
International Trade Comm'n, 910 F.2d 819 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). As such, Federal Circuit review
of temporary relief determinations under the abuse of discretion standard is also consistent with
its review of district court decisions to grant or deny preliminary relief. See Chrysler Motors
Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951,953 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("We review the trial
judge's [decision denying a preliminary injunction] to ascertain if there was an abuse of discre-
tion, an error of law, or a serious misjudgment of the evidence.").
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b. Unsupported by substantial evidence on the record
The Federal Circuit determines whether a decision is unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record in cases involving final
determinations by the ITC and the DOC in investigations and
administrative reviews in AD and CVD cases." 6 The Federal Circuit
has defined substantial evidence to be "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion."1 7 Further, "[slubstantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla."' Substantial evidence is evaluated by reviewing the
record as a whole, including "whatever fairly detracts from the
substantiality of the evidence."" 9
In their treatise on standards of federal court review, Steven
Childress and Martha Davis distinguish the substantial evidence
standard from the two standards that require the court to "agree" with
the agency determination, i.e., de novo and clearly erroneous,
because those two standards "go straight to the question of whether
the decision under review is correct."2 ° The substantial evidence
standard performs a different function. Under this standard, the
emphasis should be on the agency's reasoning process, rather than
the quantity of evidence:
[U]nder substantial evidence review, the reviewing court evaluates
the judgment of the agency for its soundness and for its proper or
reasonable exercise. The conclusion the court would have reached
in the court's sound exercise of its judgment is not relevant under
substantial evidence review.121
Under the substantial evidence test, and unlike de novo review, the
reviewing court need not agree with the agency's or lower court's
116. Also reviewed under this standard are scope determinations, suspension agreements and
determinations of administrative reviews thereof, and ITC injury determinations required to be
made on certain outstanding CVD orders pursuant to the recently enacted Uruguay Round
Agreements Act. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. The Federal Circuit also applies the substantial evidence
test to final determinations of the ITC in § 337 cases.
117. Timken Co. v. United States, 894 F.2d 385, 388 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
118. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This
definition is from ChiefJustice Hughes' opinion in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938). Accord Creswell Trading Co. v. United States, 15 F.3d 1054, 1056 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (noting that substantial evidence standard is more than "a mere scintilla"); cf. United
States v. General Elec. Co., 727 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that substantial
evidence means such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion).
119. Timken, 894 F.2d at 388 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)).
120. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.04, at 15-20.
121. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.04, at 15-20.
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decision; "it merely requires the court to find that the decision is not
an unreasonable or an unreasoning one."12
This analysis is consistent with how the Federal Circuit applies this
standard in Title VII cases." The effect of the substantial evidence
standard, therefore, is that the appellate court applying the standard
may accord more deference to the expertise of an administrative
agency than it does to the fact-finding of a district court, which is
reviewed under the less deferential clearly erroneous standard.12 1
c. Clearly erroneous
As defined by the Supreme Court, a finding is clearly erroneous
when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed."' The Federal Circuit relies on
this definition'26 in applying the clearly erroneous standard to the
findings of fact of the CIT in customs cases.1
27
d. Not in accordance with law
In AD and CVD cases, the Federal Circuit examines questions of
law to determine whether the agency's action was in accordance with
law.12  The Federal Circuit has articulated that, in reviewing matters
of law, it affords no deference to the CIT's decision." Although
122. GHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.04, at 15-22.
123. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 1232, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying
substantial evidence standard to float glass case and affirming that parties did not receive
countervallable benefits and that suspension agreement should not be terminated).
124. Notably, under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the substantial evidence test
is applied to agency action made pursuant to a "formal, trial-type" proceeding. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (E) (1994). This standard also has been required when agency rulemaking is "on the
record after opportunity for agency hearing." Id. As discussed below, Title VII proceedings are
not trial-type proceedings, nor are they rulemaking proceedings, thereby distinguishing them
from others in which the appellate court reviewing the decision of an agency may apply the
substantial evidence test. See infra notes 254-86 and accompanying text (comparing Title VII
with ITC § 337 proceedings).
125. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
126. See Superior Wire v. United States, 867 F.2d 1409, 1411-12 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (defining
clearly erroneous standard (quoting Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395)). According to Childress and
Davis, the Gypsum quote is the "classic statement" of the clearly erroneous standard. CHILDRESS,
supra note 21, § 15.02, at 15-16. They note that the standard is most often used in reviewing
fact-finding by judges in bench trials. Id. at 15-17. They further state that "the standard directs
the reviewing court to assure itself that the trial court has not made a mistake-that it has found
the correct answer." I&
127. See Mediine Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying
clearly erroneous standard of review).
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1994).
129. Kemira Fibres Oy v. United States, 61 F.3d 866, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In this case,
CircuitJudges Newman, Lourie, and Schall composed the panel; CircuitJudge Lourie authored
the opinion.
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the Federal Circuit may state that the issue before it is a question of
whether the CIT erred,18 0 the Federal Circuit will examine the law
itself, often without significant reference to the CIT's analysis.13 1
The in-accordance-with-law standard is, however, tempered by the
principle of deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute it
administers under the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.l 2 Thus,
when the legal question is one of statutory construction, the Federal
Circuit holds that the reviewing court may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the agency if the agency's interpretation is
reasonable. 33
e. De Novo
The Federal Circuit applies de novo review to questions of law in
customs and section 337 cases. The Federal Circuit has described this
standard as calling for a "full and independent" review by the
court,'14 meaning that, on questions of law, it accords no deference
to the CIT."35 Indeed, Professors Childress and Davis describe de
novo review as follows:
Under the standard called de novo review, the court is charged to
affirm only if it agrees with the decision under review-that is, if it
finds that the decision is the correct one. Where the court does
not agree that the decision is the correct one, it is authorized to
substitute its own judgment either on the basis of the agency record
130. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 66 F.3d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The central issue
in this case is whether the [CIT] erred .... ."). In this case, CircuitJudges Archer and Schall,
and Senior Circuit Judge Skelton composed the panel; Circuit Judge Schall authored the
opinion.
131. Id But see Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that CIT's exclusive jurisdiction and acquired expertise imbue its
decisions with respect and that such decisions are "valuable guides"); infra notes 138-43
(discussing Camargo and the Federal Circuit's references to the C1T).
132. Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984). The Federal Circuit has stated that both the ITC and the DOC are entitled to Chevron
deference. Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, CA v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Suramerica I].
133. Suramerica I, 966 F.2d at 665 n.5; Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Koyo Seiko Co., 36 F.3d at 1570 ("[A]n agency's construction need
notbe the ontyreasonable interpretation or even the mostreasonable interpretation.") (emphasis
added). The Federal Circuit also applies a deferential standard to the implementation of
regulations by the agency. See National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am., Inc. v.
United States, 59 F.3d 1219, 1220-24 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that Secretary is permitted to
prescribe regulations based on reasonable construction of statute); Smith-Corona Group v.
United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1576-79 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (indicating that agency is permitted to
make "adjustments" and giving deference with respect to interpretation of statute).
134. Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407, 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
135. Id.; Rico Import Co. v. United States, 12 F.3d 1088, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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or upon its own or a new remand record. The court is not bound
by the agency decision at all.3 6
On the other hand, pursuant to Chevron, the Federal Circuit appears
to accord some deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute
it administers and its regulations.1 37
2. The role of the CIT in Federal Circuit review of Title VII cases
In theory then, in Title VII cases, the Federal Circuit should be
applying the arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion
standard, the substantial evidence test, or the in-accordance-with-law
standard, to the decision of the agency, without regard to the
intervening decision by the CIT. That the Federal Circuit does not
in practice necessarily disregard the findings and opinions of the CIT
is apparent from the court's recent decision in Camargo Correa Metais,
S.A. v. United States."s In Camargo, despite the theoretical standard
of review which calls for the Federal Circuit to review anew the
decision of the agency,"9 the Federal Circuit remanded the case to the
CIT for the lower court to explain its decision. 4 The court ex-
plained:
Because the Court of International Trade enjoys exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review the decision of the ITA, its decisions on the occasions
of such review are of significant import. Given the exclusive
authority of the Court of International Trade, the expertise it develops
and maintains from its exclusivity is worthy of respect. In the
instances when the decisions of the Court of International Trade
are either not appealed to this court or are left wholly undisturbed
following appeal, those decisions are likely to "serve as valuable
136. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.02, at 15-3.
137. Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505, 510 (Fed. Cir. 1995); St. Paul Fire
& Marine v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Professors Childress and Davis also
explain that, under Chevron,
although the general rule in dealing with questions of law is that under the statutes
and by common law, courts are to apply de novo review, that rule may have no place
in statutory construction, and in any event, is considerably softened or even abandoned
in consideration of other law questions. In the administrative law setting, de novo
review now seems ruled by the application of principles of great deference.
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 15.02, at 15-16.
138. 52 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1995). On the Camargo panel were the late CircuitJudge Nies,
and CircuitJudges Clevenger and Rader. Circuit Judge Clevenger authored the opinion. At
issue in Camargo were questions of law (interpretation of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677a(d) (1) (c) and
1677b(e) (1) (A)) and fact ("factual complications" regarding the impact of the Brazilian value-
added tax and general, selling, and administrative expenses). Id. at 1041-42.
139. See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(stating that Federal Circuit should apply "anew [19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B)'s] expressjudicial
review standard"); cf. Suramerica II, 44 F.3d 978, 982 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (critiquing court's
reasoning in Atlantic Sugar).
140. Camargo Correa Metals, SA. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1040, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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guides to the rights and obligations of the international trade
community.
141
The CIT is required to state findings of fact, conclusions of law or
an opinion stating the reasons and facts upon which its decision is
based." Therefore, the court in Camargo held that "[we] cannot
provide effective and meaningful appellate review of the ITA's actions
in this case until we are supplied with the fruits of satisfaction of
section 2645(a)."'I Clearly, if only the agency's decision were
relevant, a remand for the CIT to explain itself would be unnecessary.
The decision in Camargo thus highlights the Federal Circuit's
recognition of the CIT's expertise in Title VII matters, as well as the
appellate court's reluctance to ignore the lower court's decisions."
It therefore seems that the Federal Circuit does not strictly adhere to
the Atlantic Sugar standard. Indeed, as the commentary below
illustrates, numerous reasons exist to question the wisdom of the
redundant standard of review articulated in Atlantic Sugar."
C. The Wisdom of the Redundant Standard of Review
The judicial process in the United States, regardless of the specific
fora at issue, is usually a multi-tier process. 14' A typical federal case
can thus involve a trial at the district court level, an appeal (usually
as of right) to the circuit court of appeals, and possible discretionary
review, through certiorari, by the Supreme Court.14
Where the action or decision of an administrative agency is at
issue," there exists an additional lower tier prior to the district
141. Id at 1042-43 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2645(a) (1994).
143. Camargo, 52 F.3d at 1043.
144. See id. (noting that expertise CIT maintains from its exclusive authority over Title VII
issues is "worthy of respect"); see also Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1996). In Saarstahl, although the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT because "[u]ltimately the
court did not accord sufficient deference to Commerce's approach," the appellate court's
opinion addresses the CIT's analysis at length. Id, at 1544. Even the dissenting opinion in
Saarstahl closely examines the CIT's reasoning. Id. at 1548.
145. See infra part II.C (discussing strengths and weaknesses of Atlantic Sugar standard).
146. See Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1051, 1105 n.130 (1995) (arguing that
multi-tier judicial review has been long-standing);Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The
ComingBreakdoan ofthe Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 161, 182 (1984) (describing multi-tier
judicial review).
147. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICrIoN §§ 1.4.2-1.4.4 (2d ed. 1994) (describing
function of United States Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and district courts).
148. This Article does not address the distinction between agency decision-making whereby
"determinations" are issued following some type of adjudicative process and other types of
agency action. Similarly, not per se addressed herein are the distinctions between decisions
rendered by an independent agency versus an executive branch department (or subdivision
thereof). Nevertheless, critical to the issue of the appropriate level of subsequent judicial
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court or court of appeals level, in that the agency will have already
rendered a quasi-judicial determination." Because the federal
government can be sued only to the extent that it consents to be
sued, appeals of agency action are governed by statute.15° Congress
has responded on a case-by-case basis in mandating whether the next
step lies directly with the circuit court of appeals, or instead first with
the district court and then with the appeals court." As discussed
below, some courts and commentators advocate eliminating review by
the district court.5 2 Other courts and commentators have offered
different solutions.153
Apart from the actual number of steps in the process, however, it
is important to consider the standard of review that is applied at each
step. That is, if both the district court and the appellate court apply
the exact same standard of review to the same agency action, a
redundancy is created. If, on the other hand, the district court
applies one standard and the appellate court another standard, each
court may be fulfilling a critical and unique function, and the
elimination of either step might cause harm to the administration of
justice.
With respect to Federal Circuit review of AD and CVD cases,
Congress' choice of two tiers of judicial review is a wise one. A
redundancy has crept into the process, however, through "reapplica-
tion" of the same standard of review to the agency decision, at both
judicial levels."M This Article argues that this redundancy can and
should be eliminated, in rhetoric and in practice, through formal
adoption by the Federal Circuit of a new standard of review, to be
applied to the decision of the CIT, rather than to that of the
agency.155
scrutiny is the nature of the agency action that is appealed and the procedures and structures
underlying that final act.
149. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1974).
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (6) (1994) (codifying exceptions to sovereign immunity from
attachment or execution).
151. See infra part II.C.3.b.ii.b (MSPB structure); part I1I.B (Boards of Contract Appeals and
Court of Federal Claims structure).
152. See infra notes 179-203 and accompanying text (discussing, e.g., Pokcover opinion).
153. See infra notes 167-73, 363-73 and accompanying text (discussing use of different
standard of appellate review and discretionary appellate review, respectively).
154. See infra notes 179-212 and accompanying text (discussing standard of review in two-
tiered review systems).
155. See infra notes 213-23 and accompanying text (discussing alternative standard of review
for Title VII cases).
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1. The Federal Circuit's view as expressed by the Suramerica II panel
In December 1994, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit, in
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States (Suramerica
17),116 addressed and questioned the Atlantic Sugar standard of
review. Sitting on the Suramerica JIpanel were CircuitJudges Michel,
Plager, and Rader. 57 Circuit Judge Rader wrote the opinion.58
The issue to be decided was the propriety of an ITC "threat of
material injury" determination. 5 9
Judicial review of the ITC's decision, the court acknowledged, was
governed by a mandatory two-tier system."6 The agency decision
was first examined by the CIT to discern whether it was "'unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.""' The court then explained that, on appeal from the
CIT, the established role of the Federal Circuit was to reapply the
same substantial evidence standard to the agency decision. 62
The Suramerica 11 court recognized that this process of appellate
review originated in Atlantic Sugar,"6 but noted that the standard
was presented without reference to previous case law and without
statutory support164 Further, the panel recognized that the stan-
dard had been applied uniformly by the Federal Circuit on multiple
occasions." Nevertheless, in a footnote accompanying this section
of the opinion, the panel explained that it had serious reservations
about the underpinnings of the Atlantic Sugar analysis: "Atlantic Sugar
appears to rely on a belief that the statute prescribes this court's
standard of review. Read as a whole, however, § 1516a does not
support this proposition."' 66  The panel also suggested that a
different approach might be warranted if the panel were not bound
156. 44 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
157. Suramerica 11, 44 F.Sd 978, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
158. Id.
159. Id at 982.
160. See id. (explaining that CIT first examines ITC's determination and then Federal Circuit
reviews CIT's review).
161. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B) (1988)).
162 Id. (citing Trent Tube Div. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube AB, 975 F.2d 807, 813 (Fed. Cir.
1992)). "This court reviews a decision of the Court of International Trade by applying for itself
the statutory judicial review standard... to the underlying ITC determination." Id.
163. Id. at 982 n.1.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 983; see also Trent Tube Div. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube AB, 975 F.2d 807, 813 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Olympic Adhesives Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
166. Suramerica I, 44 F.3d at 982 n.1.
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by prior precedent. 16 7  The better approach suggested by the
Suramerica I panel was one used by the Supreme Court in reviewing
labor relations decisions from the regional courts of appeal:16,
Were this a case of first impression, this court might follow the
example of the Supreme Court when it was called on to review a
review of an administrative action:
Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial
evidence to support agency findings is a question which
Congress has placed in the keeping of the [court review-
ing the agency determination.] This Court will intervene
only in what ought to be the rare instance when the
[substantial evidence] standard appears to have been
misapprehended or grossly misapplied.
Congress has placed the review of ITC determinations in the
keeping of the Court of International Trade. That court has the
statutory mission to review ITC determinations for substantial
evidence. If in a future appeal this court were offered the
opportunity to reconsider the Atlantic Sugar rule in banc, this court
might better consider only whether the Court of International
Trade misapprehended or grossly misapplied the statutory stan-
dard.169
Thus, the Suramerica II panel raised doubts about the appropriate-
ness of mandatory two-tier judicial review that pays little or no heed
to the findings of the lower court."' 0 However, unlike other courts
and commentators who have suggested elimination of the intermedi-
ate review phase,"' the Suramerica H panel did not suggest the
removal of the CIT from the judicial review process. Rather, in what
this Article submits is a sound approach, the Suramerica 1i panel
suggested that a more limited role for the court of appeals might be
in order.
Moreover, despite the panel's statement that it applied "anew" to
the decision of the agency the same standard of review as applied by
the CIT, the panel made it clear that it would not simply disregard
the CIT's findings out of hand: "Although reviewing anew the ITC
determination, this court will not ignore the informed opinion of the
167. i& at 982 n.1.
168. See infra notes 187-94 and 201-12 and accompanying text (discussing standard criticisms
and inapplicability of such criticisms to Title VII cases).
169. Surameica 1, 44 F.Sd at 982 n.1 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 840 U.S.
474, 491 (1951)). It appears that the court in Suramerica II did not itself wish to reconsider the
Atlantic Sugarstandard because a rehearing was denied, and a suggestion for rehearing in banc
was declined, on February 10, 1995. I& at 978.
170. See id at 983-84.
171. See infra notes 181-200 and accompanying text.
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Court of International Trade. That court reviewed the record in
considerable detail. Its opinion deserves due respect.""72 This statement
highlights how the Federal Circuit's enunciated standard of review is
not necessarily applied in practice; in actuality, the Federal Circuit
accords more deference to the CIT than would appear to be the case
if the enunciated standard were accepted at face value.173
Since the Suramerica II decision was handed down, the Federal
Circuit has decided twenty-five cases dealing with CVD and AD
law.'74 Of those twenty-five decisions, eight followed the Atlantic
Sugar review standard,1"h while five referred to 19 U.S.C.
§ 151 6a(b) (1) (B) or articulated the statutory standard without further
comment.1'7 In eight cases, the Federal Circuit addressed questions
of law and reviewed CIT opinions under a de novo standard (with
deference applied to the agency's interpretation of the statute),
without citing Atlantic Sugar or 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B).17 The
172. Suramerica II, 44 F.3d at 983-84 (emphasis added).
173. See id. (explaining court's intent to take limited role in reviewing CIT's decision).
174. Based on an on-line computer search conducted on or about the date this Article was
submitted.
175. See Grupo Indus. Camesa v. United States, 85 F.3d 1577, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing
Atlantic Sugar); Torrington Co. v. United States, 82 F.3d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[W]e
'apply anew' the [CIT's] statutorily-mandated standard of review to the administrative review."
(citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 1232, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1992))); Timken Co.
v. United States, No. 95-1304, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1350, at *3 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 22,1996) (citing
Atlantic Sugar); Sugiyama Chain Co. v. United States, No. 94-1512, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17075,
at *5 (Fed. Cir.July 11, 1995) (stating that Federal Circuitwill uphold CIT's affirmance of DOC
determination, unless determination "is unsupported by substantial evidence... or is otherwise
not in accordance with the law"); Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. v. United States, 66 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (noting that in reviewing Cffjudgment, "'this court must apply anew the statute's
express standard of review to the agency's determination'" (quoting NEC Home Elecs., Ltd. v.
United States, 54 F.3d 736, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1995))); Sharp Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1092,
1095 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that CIT applies statutory substantial evidence standard to agency
determination, and that Federal Circuit applies same standard on appeal); Kemira Fibres Oy v.
United States, 61 F.3d 866, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reviewing question of law "without according
deference to the trial court").
176. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 77 F.3d 426, 429 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing
second issue using substantial evidence in accordance with law standard); NTN Bearing Corp.
v. United States, No. 95-1478, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 13258, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 1996)
("Commerce's administrative review determinations must be sustained unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence or are not in accordance with law." (citing Zenith, 77 F.3d
at 430)); FAG Kugelfischer Georg Schafer KgA v. United States, No. 96-1074; 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11544, at *4-5 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 1996) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B) without
elaboration); NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 74 F.3d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (applying
statutory standard without comment); Floral Trade Council v. United States, 74 F.3d 1200, 1201-
02 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (referring to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a-(b) (1) (B)).
177. See, e.g., Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 85 F.3d 1561, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (involving
ITC's like product determination and injury analysis); Inland Steel Bar Co. v. United States, Nos.
94-1460, 94-1491, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8280, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 1996) (per curiam)
(involving DOC's determination of countervailability of subsidy bestowed on entity that is later
sold in arm's-length transaction); Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (same issue as Inland Steel; Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 77 F.3d 426, 429 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (involving circumstance of sale adjustment for warranty expenses in DOC's
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remaining five decisions reached a conclusion without stating the
standard of review followed."8 Hence, other Federal Circuit panels
have yet to address the suggestion of the Suramerica II panel.
2. The battle over two-tier mandatory review in which the same standard
of review is reapplied
In questioning the parameters of the two-tiered appellate process,
the Federal Circuit is not alone. Indeed, there has been a long-
running battle over the appropriateness of mandatory two-tier review
of agency action where the same standard of review is applied at both
levels.' 79 A substantial portion of the case law addressing mandatory
two-tier review arose out of federal employee discharge suits."8
Through a series of opinions, beginning in the mid-1960s and
running up to 1980, the D.C. Circuit made it known that it believed
two-tier mandatory review of agency action was suspect.'
8
'
The most demonstrative attack was presented in Polcover v. Secretary
of Treasury."2 The suit was initiated in the district court by a former
Internal Revenue agent who was seeking to be reinstated in his
antidumping calculation); Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(interpreting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (3) (B) (1988) regarding best information available rule);
Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 64 F.Sd 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (interpreting
19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1988) regarding circumstances under which countervailing duties are
imposed, and stating that Federal Circuit reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo
because "[i]f the statutory language is clear, then that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress")
(citations omitted); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1575 (1995)
(interpreting various statutory provisions concerning AD margin methodology). Note that
several cases were decided based on Federal-Mogul without explicitly stating that they rested on
questions of statutory interpretation. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1572, 1576
(1995) (interpreting several statutory AD provisions).
178. Hosiden Corp., 85 F.3d at 1563 (reviewing lawfulness of CIT's grant of writ of manda-
mus); Ad Hoc Comm. of AZ-NM-TX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United States,
No. 95-1129, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28118, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 1995) (affirming CIT
decision following remand in case originally appealed to Federal Circuit prior to Suramerica Ii);
Camargo Correa Metals, S.A. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1040, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (remanding
case to CIT due to CIT's failure to provide opinion stating reasons and facts on which its
decision was based); Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778,
779-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming CIT's rejection of DOC scope determination, but reversing
CIT's own interpretation of scope, holding that latter issue should be remanded to agency);
Yamaji Fishing Net Co. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming CITjudgment,
which affirmed DOC determination).
179. See infra notes 182-96 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Circuit's critique of
system).
180. See generally infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text (review of employee discharge
case).
181. Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 190 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Walker v. Washington,
627 F.2d 541, 544 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1225-28
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 234 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Goldwasser v. Brown,
417 F.2d 1169, 1171 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 647 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Connelly v. Nitze, 401 F.2d 416, 417 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
182. 477 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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former position with back pay.18 Before addressing the merits of
the suit, Circuit Judge Tamm presented a dialogue on the panel's
frustration with the system of judicial review, stating that "we desire
to take note of the duplicative nature of judicial review achieved in
employee adverse action litigation.""
In such cases, prior to appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the district court
would dispose of the case based on an administrative record.185 The
appellate court described its function as follows:
No specific deference is paid to the decision of the district court
(such would be most difficult in any event in the instance of no
district court opinion); rather this court reviews the record and
determines anew if there has been procedural error, if there is
substantial evidence to support the action, or if the Commission
action is in some manner otherwise arbitrary or capricious. In
other words, we conduct the identical review we are so often called
upon to use in statutorily provided judicial review of other agency
orders. The only difference is that in this instance our review
follows identical review in the district court. Duplication, delay,
expense and despair for the employee-litigant are inherent in such
a system. The interposition of the district court serves, it seems to
us, no viable purpose .... 18'
Interestingly, Judge Tamm also presented as a possible solution the
same option that the Suramerica 11 court suggested, 187 namely,
adoption of the standard of review employed by the Supreme Court
in NLRB appeals,'ta i.e., whether the lower court misapprehended
or grossly misapplied the standard of review.
Perhaps one way to avoid the duplication would be to accord some
deference to the district court's review of the record and its
determinations. A parallel to such action could be drawn to the
Supreme Court's occasional usage of a "hands off' policy regarding
courts of appeals decisions in statutory agency review cases.
89
Yet, like the Suramerica 11 panel, Judge Tamm believed the D.C.
Circuit panel was precluded from adopting the Supreme Court's
183. Md at 1231.
184. Id. at 1225.
185. See id. (explaining that employee discharge cases are decided on basis of administrative
record and that they "should be governed by the principles generally applicable to judicial
review of administrative action").
186. Id at 1226-27 (footnote and citation omitted).
187. See id. at 1227; see also Suramerica 1, 44 F.3d 978, 982-83 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
188. Pokover, 477 F.2d at 1227.
189. Id. (citing NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 502-03 (1951); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951)).
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standard because of case precedent."9 Before reaching that conclu-
sion, however, he explained that even if it were a case of first
impression, use of the Supreme Court NLRB standard would be
inappropriate for three other reasons. 191 First, the legislative intent
underlying the NLRB statute was considered unique to that area of
the law.
"Congress has charged the Courts of Appeals and not this Court
with the normal and primary responsibility for granting or denying
enforcement of the Labor Board orders. No similar Congressional
charge exists here."192
Second, Judge Tamm noted that the Supreme Court itself had
experienced difficulty in the execution of such a "rule." '193 Third,
there was a fear that such a rule in application either would amount
to a rubber-stamp or would degenerate into the test then being
utilized by the Polcover court.1'
The Polcover court concluded by emphasizing the fact that the D.C.
Circuit had raised the enigma of mandatory two-tier review previously,
but had been ignored.1 9 Accordingly, the court gave an earnest
plea for the legislature to step in and study the problem.
196
Since Polcover, several other appeals courts have addressed the
pitfalls of two-tier mandatory review of agency action. In a recent
social security benefits case, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
stated:
The wisdom of inserting the district court as a reviewing court in
between an administrative agency and the court of appeals can be
and has been questioned, but it is a fact of life that we are not
190. See id. (explaining that such standard "would be contrary to unwaivering [sic] precedent
established in this circuit").
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. at 502 (citations omitted)).
193. Id (footnote omitted).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1228.
196. See id. (declaring that "knowledgeable study of the problem is necessary"). The plea was
finally heeded, and Congress stepped in by permitting direct appeals to be made to the Court
of Claims or to a United States court of appeals. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-454, § 205, 92 Stat. 1111, 1138 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b) (1994)) (allowing for
more efficient appeals process); see alsoJohnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 190 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (praising Congress for correcting "waste ofjudicial resources"). Employee discharge
cases were later made part of the MSPB'sjurisdiction with direct appellate review by the Federal
Circuit. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 144, 96 Star. 25, 45
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7703) (establishing Federal Circuit and granting appellate
review, inter alia, of MSPB cases). As such, while district court review of agency employment
action was eliminated, the MSPB was added as an intermediate reviewing body. Hence, two tiers
of review still exist. Given the CIT's experience in handling Title VII cases, it would not make
sense to create a different reviewing body to perform the same functions as the CIT currently
performs. The redundancy in the standard of review can be addressed more directly.
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authorized to ignore by undertaking to issue our orders directly to
the agency, even though that would make life simpler.
19 7
In addition to jurists, several commentators have questioned the
merits of a mandatory two-tier system of review in administrative cases.
Among the most notable is the discussion presented by Professors
Childress and Davis who inquire into whether anything is ever
accomplished by a two-tier system of review of agency action.
1 98 If
the agency has "developed" and "screened" the record on which it
bases its decision, the authors reason, the primary function of a
district court has already been performed."x Therefore, unless
additional evidence is necessary, the district and appellate courts will
be duplicating each other's work.2°
The authors also point out that this type of repetition occurs with
respect to the Supreme Court's review of circuit court decisions in
labor relations cases. 2°1  The Supreme Court has stated that its role
in such instances is limited to correcting "gross errors" in the
application of the substantial evidence standard.0 2 Nevertheless, in
the authors' view, what the Supreme Court often does is to apply
anew the same substantial evidence test and substitute its judgment
"in no particular pattern."20
3
These various concerns, which have been expressed regarding two-
tier appellate review generally, in many respects are not valid where
the Federal Circuit's review of Title VII cases is at issue. Foremost is
the fact that in AD and CVD cases, the first step of the appellate
process (which occurs at the CIT) fulfills a critical function. It is at
this stage that the administrative record is thoroughly compiled by the
relevant agency for submission to the CIT and fully reviewed and
197. Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1994).
198. SeeCHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 14.07, at 14-23 to 14-24 (discussing redundancy
of review system and noting few changes in second review).
199. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 14.07, at 14-23.
200. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 14.07, at 14-23.
201. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 14.07, at 14-24.
202. NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 502 (1951). The Court emphasized the
importance of adhering to the "usual rule of non-interference" except in cases involving
"principles the settlement of which is of importance to the public as distinguished from that of
the parties" or where there is a "real and embarassing [sic] conflict of opinion" between circuits.
Id. (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co., 274 U.S. 543, 544 (1927); Layne
& Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923)); see also Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951) (asserting that Supreme Court's intervention should
be "rare").
203. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 14.07, at 14-24 (alleging that Supreme Court
appliesjudgment randomly); see also Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974) (applying "narrow" scope of review); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389,
392-96 (1953) (reversing 9th Circuit's decision while using same standard of review).
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filtered by the parties. °4  This screening step is necessary and
valuable because of the nature of Title VII proceedings which, at best,
can be described as informal "adjudication." 5
Further, Judge Tamm's criticism in Polcover of the fact that a district
court reviewing an agency determination may not even provide an
opinion, is inapplicable to Title VII cases. Indeed, Title 28 requires
the CIT to provide findings of fact, conclusions of law, or an opinion
explaining its decision.26  Because the Federal Circuit also will
require the CIT to meet this statutory mandate, the appellate court
clearly views the CIT, and its expertise and its opinions, as a valuable
component of the process.2 7  Hence, the Federal Circuit has
already taken steps logically leading in the direction thatJudge Tamm
had suggested as an alternative-namely, according deference to the
lower court's review of agency action.
208
With respect to Judge Tamm's four reasons for not adopting the
Supreme Court's standard from NLRB cases,2° only the fourth
reason-prior precedent in the circuit-should stand in the Federal
Circuit's way in Title VII cases. The first concern-that Congress
charged the lower court and not the higher court with primary
responsibility for such cases-is met here. Indeed, the Suramerica II
panel specifically recognized that Congress charged the CIT with
primary responsibility for reviewing agency action in Title VII
cases. 210 As to the second concern--difficulty in application of the
Supreme Court rule-this Article submits that, given the dichotomy
in the Federal Circuit's current approach, the Supreme Court rule
certainly would be no more difficult to apply." Finally, the third
concern with whether application of the Supreme Court standard
would result in a mere rubber-stamping or a degeneration into the
apply anew standard, is one that is within the appellate court's power
204. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 252-86 and accompanying text (contrasting agency procedure between
Title VII and § 337 cases as illustration of why specific proposals to eliminate CIT from appellate
process are unsound). In fact, use of the phrase "adjudication" with respect to Title VII
proceedings is somewhat misleading.
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2645(a) (1994).
207. See Camargo Correa Metais, SA- v. United States, 52 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(declaring that CIT decisions reviewing DOC determinations are "of significant import").
208. See Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.3d 1223, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (drawing
parallel betweenjudge Tamm's suggestion and Supreme Court's occasional usage of"hands off'
policy regarding review of agency decisions by courts of appeal).
209. See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text (analyzingJudge Tamm's four reasons).
210. See Suramerica II, 44 F.3d 978, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (focusing on 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b) (1) (B), which sets forth standard of review for CIT for certain Title VII issues).
211. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit's decisions in the "Vaccine Act" cases, see infra notes
439-49 and accompanying text, illustrate just how unwieldy the Atlantic Sugar standard can
become.
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to control. Moreover, because the Federal Circuit does not always use
the apply anew standard, to bring theory into conformity with practice
would be advisable.212
3. Possible alternatives to the current two-tiered structure in Title VI cases
There exist a variety of possible alternatives to the current review
process in Title VII cases. Some of these alternatives have been
implemented in other types of cases. The least drastic, namely,
application by the Federal Circuit of a different standard of review, is
the most viable for Title VII cases. Unlike most other alternatives, it
would not entail legislative action of any sort. Furthermore, it pays
due deference to the specialized expertise of the CIT, as well as to the
particularities of the underlying administrative proceedings. Such an
approach also would not shift functions to an appellate-level court
that are more properly within the province of a trial-level court.
Moreover, application by the Federal Circuit of a different standard
of review in Title VII cases would eliminate the redundancy that
currently exists in theory, if not always in practice.
a. Application by the Federal Circuit of a different review standard
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit has itself suggested an
alternative standard of review.21 Rather than removing the lower
court from the process, the Federal Circuit could limit the standard
of review that it uses to the "hands off'21 4 approach used by the
Supreme Court in NLRB decisions.1 5 Under this approach, the
CIT would continue to apply the statutory standards of review that it
is required to apply. On subsequent appeal, however, the Federal
Circuit would review the CIT's decision to determine whether the
lower court has misapprehended or grossly misapplied the statutory
standard of review. Further, if the Federal Circuit should perceive
egregious error of some sort, it would have the ability to step in and
correct the error. Although the Polcover decision to some extent
212. See supra notes 138-45 and 174-78 and accompanying text (addressing importance of
CIT's role and detailing Federal Circuit's lack of consistent focus on standard of review in Title
VII cases).
213. See Suramerica 1, 44 F.3d at 982 n.1 (suggesting giving greater deference to lower court's
review).
214. See Pokover, 477 F.2d at 1227 (referring to Supreme Court's NLRB approach as "hands
off').
215. See NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 502-03 (1951) (recommending that
Supreme Court abstain from frequent intervention); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 490-91 (1951) (applying review only in rare instances).
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criticizes such an approach,216 given the particularized expertise of
the CIT in Title VII cases, this seems nevertheless to be a sound
217option.
In the application of such a standard of review, the issue naturally
arises as to whether it should matter if the CIT reversed the agency.
Indeed, the infirmities inherent in the Atlantic Sugar rule come to the
forefront in cases where the CIT has reversed and remanded a case
to the agency.218 Where the agency issues a redetermination that
is different from the original determination, on subsequent appeal,
pursuant to the Atlantic Sugar rule, the Federal Circuit reviews both
determinations under the substantial evidence test. In fact, the
Federal Circuit has stated that it does review both agency decisions in
these circumstances.1 9 Given the nature of the substantial evidence
test, however, it is entirely conceivable that both agency determina-
tions could be deemed to be supported by substantial evidence.220
The dilemma thus faced by the court is the issue of which decision
should take precedence. Needless to say, under a pure Atlantic Sugar
approach, resolution of this issue is somewhat awkward. In fact, such
a scenario effectively requires the Federal Circuit to modify its
approach.2
21
216. See Poaover, 477 F.2d at 1227 (setting forth four chief criticisms of "hands off' review
policy).
217. See Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
International TradeJudicial Review: Is t ProvingEffective in Resolving Trade Cases?, 131 F.tLD. 217,
305 (1990) [hereinafter Proceedings] (comments of Francis J. Sailer, DOG Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Investigations) (defending two-tier judicial review of Title VII cases).
218. The Federal Circuit generally does not review non-final decisions of the lower tribunal.
For example, the court reviews a CIT decision remanding an AD or CVD case to the DOC only
after the CIT makes a final, non-remandjudgment. See Trent Tube Div. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube
AB, 975 F.2d 807, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming CIT's initial remand and final decision
regarding ITC determination). After such ajudgment is rendered, the Federal Circuit in effect
reviews both decisions, i.e., the decision to remand and the decision regarding the agency's
redetermination upon remand. See id. (explaining that "[o]nly after affirming the decision to
remand do we reach the appeal from the Court of International Trade's affirmance of the
remand decision").
219. Suramerica II, 44 F.3d 978, 982-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (outlining courts' review processes).
220. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 978 F.2d 1232, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.") (citation
omitted); Maine Potato Council v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985)
(stating that when ITC determination is supported by substantial evidence, it "does not mean
that the evidence could not have supported another conclusion").
221. See Camargo Correa Metals, SA v. United States, 52 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
discussed supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text. In Camargo, the CIT reversed the initial
agency decision and the agency accordingly rendered a second decision dramatically different
from the first. The CIT's affirmance of the latter decision, without explanation, left the Federal
Circuit with insufficient basis to render a decision. As such, the Federal Circuit remanded the
case to the CIT to provide a more in-depth analysis. Id. at 1042. In such a situation, the Federal
Circuit seems to recognize the critical nature of the CIT's decision-making process.
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The dilemma can be avoided if the approach touched upon
although not endorsed by the Polcover court, but subsequently
suggested by the Suramerica IT panel, is followed.222 Under this
approach,22 if the CIT is found to have misapprehended or misap-
plied the standard of review in rendering its reversal and decision to
remand to the agency, then the CIT decision would be reversed and
the initial agency decision would presumably stand. If the CIT did
not err vis-a-vis the standard of review, then the CIT would be
affirmed and the later agency decision would stand, as approved by
the CIT (assuming of course that the CIT did not somehow misappre-
hend or misapply the standard of review in affirming the remand
results).
b. Elimination of review by the CIT
As an alternative to the two-tiered review process currently in place
for AD and CVD cases, some commentators suggest abolishing the
CIT's role in such cases.224 For the reasons discussed below, such
a suggestion is ill-conceived.2z
The seriousness of the attempts to eliminate the CIT's jurisdiction
in Title VII cases is evidenced by the Unfair Trade Remedies
Simplification Act of 1983, which was sponsored by Senators George
Mitchell (D-Me.) and John H. Chafee (R-R.I.).226 That bill, al-
though never adopted, sought to alter the judicial review process in
Title VII cases.227  A fact sheet issued in connection with the bill
summarized its relevant provisions as follows:
[AD and CVD] cases are currently subject to a two-step appeals
process, in which determinations are first appealed to the Court of
International Trade and then to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. The only function of the courts in these cases is to
conduct an appellate review of the agency proceedings. Such
review is more appropriate for a court of appeals than for a trial
court. By eliminating the first step in this process, the bill brings
222. Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court in
Polover explained:
Perhaps one way to avoid the duplication would be to accord some deference to the
district court's review of the record and its determination. A parallel to such action
could be drawn to the Supreme Court's occasional usage of a "hands off' policy
regarding courts of appeals decisions in statutory agency review cases.
I&
223. See id. (discussing Supreme Court's "hands off' policy).
224. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
225. See infra notes 226-311 and accompanying text.
226. 129 CONG. REC. 20,578 (1983).
227. See H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1984) (declining to adopt Senate bill
No. 1672, which was intended to make trade relief more accessible to small businesses).
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the import relief area into conformity with the usual administrative
practice and reduces the costs associated with appellate review by
two different courts.22
Trumpeting the legislation as a boon to small businesses seeking relief
from subsidized or dumped imports, the two senators argued that the
high costs associated with Title VII cases could be directly attributed
to the two-tier system ofjudicial review in which the lower court, i.e.,
the CIT, purportedly played no substantive role.2 29 By permitting
direct appeal to the Federal Circuit, the senators reasoned, a
substantial reduction in costs would occur and Title VII cases would
be brought "into line" with the majority of administrative appeals
under other statutes.2 ° As demonstrated below, this analysis is
overly simplistic.
i. Practical considerations militate against immediate appeal to
the Federal Circuit
While well intentioned, Senators Mitchell and Chafee overstate the
benefits of their proposal and fail to comprehend many of its pitfalls.
As to the issue of cost-saving, most litigants in Title VII cases would
agree that it is the first step of the appellate process that is the most
expensive and time-consuming. That is, the initial effort involved in
sorting through the record to develop factual support and in
researching the legal issues for a case is costly and burdensome. To
recast the already distilled record and legal support for purposes of
presenting a second brief (and oral argument) usually involves
decidedly less time and expense. Thus, regardless of whether the first
step occurs before the CIT or the Federal Circuit, the more costly
step would nonetheless not be eliminated; it would just change venue.
Moreover, appeals in the first instance to the Federal Circuit, rather
than to the CIT, present certain practical problems. First and
foremost is compilation of the record. The CIT's rules grant the
agencies forty days after service of a complaint to file the administra-
tive record with the court 2s1  Because many AD and CVD cases
involve multiple parties and countries, the administrative records
before the agencies are voluminous. In addition, many internal DOC
memoranda are not placed in the official administrative record, in
228. 129 CONG. REC. 20,580 (1983) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
229. I& at 20,578.
230. I& at 20,579-80.
231. GT. INT'L TRADE R. 71(a). Under the alternative procedures of Rule 71(b), a certified
list of the entire record's contents, along with copies of all documents that the parties have
designated, may instead be filed.
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practice, until a case is completed and the record is compiled for
appeal. As a result, the agencies (particularly the DOC) often require
and seek several extensions of time in order to compile the official
record to have it placed on microfiche (in the case of the DOC
record) and then to submit it to the CIT. The Federal Circuit's rules,
however, require the first brief to be filed within sixty days of docket-
ing."2 Because that brief must contain any necessary citations to
the record, such a brief likely could not be filed within the sixty-day
limit because the official record (or index thereof) would not yet be
available.
More problematic is designation of record citations for the
appendix required by the Federal Circuit's rules,"' which is to be
done even earlier, within ten days of docketing by the appellant, and
ten days thereafter, by the appellee." Obviously, the parties can do
neither until the official record (or index) is compiled and made
available to the court and the parties. Hence, given the practical
limitations faced by the agencies in compiling the record in a short
time frame, the Federal Circuit would need to revise its rules to
accommodate Title VII cases or be barraged with motions for
enlargements of time resulting from unavailability of the record.35
A second practical problem with direct appeal to the Federal
Circuit is the fifty-page limit on briefs at the Federal Circuit."'
Briefs to the CIT at the first step of the review process in Title VII
cases can range up to 200 pages or more, and frequently run between
232. FED. Ci. R. 31(a).
233. FED. CI R. 30(b).
234. FED. CI. R. 30(b). The rules do allow the parties to extend this timetable, but not so
that it will delay the filing of briefs. Id. An ancillary problem is the requirement of appendix
designations so soon into the appellate process. Under the current system of review, appendix
designations, while required early in the process before the Federal Circuit, do not occur until
after the parties have fully briefed and argued the issues before the CIT. If CIT review were
eliminated and Federal Circuit review were to become the first step of the process rather than
the second step, then appendix designations would be required at a very early stage, before the
parties have had an opportunity to review fully and to distill the record and their legal
arguments. Thus, it is unlikely that parties could meaningfully designate the appendix only 10-
20 days after docketing, i.e., within a few weeks after appeal issues are identified in a complaint.
235. Availability of an official record (or an index thereof) is a critical issue in Title VII
appeals. For example, during the course of the administrative proceeding, a respondent may
waive receipt of service of confidential submissions from other respondents. On appeal,
however, it may be critical for one respondent to know how the DOC handled the same issue
for another respondent. Thus, the respondent must await compilation and receipt of the official
record to obtain the necessary information and then to determine whether it will rely on it for
purposes of its appendix designations. See infranotes 267-68 and accompanying text (explaining
that, as practical matter, compilation of official record, particularly at DOC, often occurs after
administrative decision is rendered).
236. FED. CiR. R 28(c). Principle briefs may not exceed 50 pages, and if a cross-appeal is
filed, the appellant's reply brief must not exceed 35 pages. Md
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50-100 pages. 7 This is because many issues are raised in such
briefs, particularly by domestic industries which dispute agency
findings as to multiple foreign respondents in a single action.
238
Although shorter briefs would save costs, given the complexity of Title
VII cases, litigants' due process rights should not be sacrificed.
Furthermore, the administrative burden on the Federal Circuit
would be increased as to matters that are more typically and appropri-
ately handled by a district court. For example, in most Title VII cases,
a significant amount of confidential information is submitted to the
agencies under administrative protective orders.2 9 These protective
orders generally do not continue into the appellate process.24°
237. As discussed in note 238, infra, when a petition is filed against numerous respondents
from a variety of countries, the administrative proceedings, as well as any subsequent appeals,
can and do become very complex. Not only may the petitioner or petitioners file appeals from
both the ITC and DOC decisions, but many of the respondents may bring their own appellate
actions challenging myriad issues. Inherent in the CIT's role as a trial-level court is the
flexibility to manage its docket. Thus, for example, in the antifriction bearing and flat-rolled
steel Title VII cases, the CIT established comprehensive scheduling and case assignment
procedures to coordinate the logistical problems that arise when multiple summonses and
complaints all stem from the same administrative determination. Because the government is the
defendant in all of these actions, without a staggered schedule, it would be impossible for the
respective agencies and their counsel to brief hundreds of issues all at once. (Similar problems
also exist for petitioners and respondents.) Indeed, in such cases, CiTjudges may impose page
limits on briefs and may urge multiple plaintiffs or defendant-intervenors to submit consolidated
briefs with a higher page limit. The Federal Circuit, however, because of its status as an
appellate court that sits as a collegial body, does not have built into its practice and procedures
the mechanisms necessary to address such complex cases in the first instance. Thus, such
complex cases further illustrate why it would be ill-advised to eliminate the CIT from the Title
VII review process.
238. An AD or CVD proceeding affects all imports of a particular product from the country
or countries enumerated in the petition. For example, in the Title VII investigations of.
antiffiction bearings, the petition alleged dumping or subsidization or both as to imports from
nine countries, usually involving at least several respondents in each country. The rTro's injury
analysis, however, considered these imports on a cumulative basis. Accordingly, the petitioner's
CIT appeal affected multiple respondents who intervened in the action. Similarly, the DOC, in
rendering its final determination or final results in such a case, typically addresses issues
affecting multiple respondents in a single decision. Because the decision may literally address
hundreds of issues, a domestic party's subsequent appeal could dispute numerous findings
affecting numerous respondents. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, CIT Ct. No. 92-
06-00422, wherein many respondents from various countries intervened in the domestic party's
action challenging the DOG's final results of review in the antifriction bearing proceedings.
239. 19 C.F.R. § 207.7 (1995) (regarding release of business proprietary information under
administrative protective order in ITO proceeding); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.32, 353.34, 355.32, 355.34
(same in DOG proceedings). In their investigations, both the DOG and the ITO seek a
substantial amount of confidential material from U.S. petitioners and foreign respondents. See,
e.g., Polyvinyl Alcohol from China, Japan and Taiwan, USITO Pub. 2960, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-726,
727 and 729, at I-1 (May 1996) (U.S. data); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL ch. 4, at 2 (Oct. 1995) [hereinafterANTiDUMPING MANU-
AL] (describing specific pricing data to be gathered in questionnaire).
240. See sample applications for disclosure of confidential information in DOC and ITO
proceedings at para. 19(d), (e) (DOC) and para. C(2), (3) (ITO) (requiring destruction or
return of documents upon completion of administrative proceeding or granting of judicial
protective order if an appeal is sought). In cases involving Canadian and Mexican merchandise,
the administrative protective orders may continue into the appellate process.
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Instead, the parties must seek judicial protective orders from the
CIT.241 While not usually a contentious process, it can be cumber-
some from an administrative point of view. A court such as the CIT,
where a single judge is assigned to a case, can more efficiently handle
these types of issues than a federal court of appeals. Similarly, a
substantial number of Title VII cases involve the issuance of prelimi-
nary injunctions to prevent Customs from liquidating entries during
the pendency of an appeal.2" Again, while an appeals court
certainly has the ability to issue an injunction, this should not be
made part of an appellate court's routine functions.
ii. The review process for other agency determinations does not
support removal of the CIT from the Title VIT review process
Regarding the goal of Senators Mitchell and Chafee of bringing
Title VII cases in line with other administrative appeals,2' two-tier
review is far from the exception. The Polcover decision is but one
illustration of the fact that two-tier review is not limited to AD and
CVD cases."4 Indeed, within the Federal Circuit's own jurisdiction,
two-tier judicial review is present with regard to appeals from the
Court of Veterans Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims."4 With
regard to appeals from agency boards of contract appeals and the
MSPB, while no lower court is involved prior to review by the Federal
Circuit, the agency boards and the MSPB perform a first-tier appellate
function. Moreover, the senators' desire to have Title VII cases
parallel those in which only a single tier of review resting with the
court of appeals is available is ill-conceived due to the nature of Title
VII cases. Administrative cases that proceed directly to the court of
appeals generally involve a formal adjudication at the lower level, e.g.,
a section 337 investigation,2" or an NLRB proceeding.2 47 Title VII
241. Id
242. "Liquidation" is a term of art used to describe the point at which customs duties are
assessed with finality. Without an injunction, liquidation occurs, thus mooting an appeal in most
instances.
243. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
244. Mandatory two-tier review also exists with respect to denials of certain social security
benefits. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, Apr. 2, 1990, at 55-60 (discussing
application of two-tiered review to new set of facts).
245. See supra notes 72-78 (Court of Veterans Appeals) and infra notes 429-68 (Court of
Federal Claims) and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining that Federal Circuit hears direct
appeals of final determinations of the ITC under § 337); see also infra notes 254-86 and
accompanying text (discussing § 337 cases).
247. Similarly, MSPB cases, which entail intermediate review by an administrative board,
whether viewed as single-tier or two-tier review proceedings, allow for an evidentiary hearing at
the intermediate level. Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 774 n.5 (1985). For a discussion of the
MSPB appeals process, see infra notes 287-311 and accompanying text.
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cases are distinguishable from these cases because there is no formal
adjudication in Title VII proceedings. Hence, by analogy, single-tier
review would be inappropriate in Title VII cases."
Nevertheless, the senators are not alone in portraying two-tier
review of agency action as exceptional and suggesting elimination of
review by the CIT. One commentator, who has argued that the CIT
itself should be disbanded, has proposed either a system of adminis-
trative adjudication with direct appeal to the Federal Circuit or, in
certain instances, transferring jurisdiction to the federal district
courts. 49 Specifically, with respect to Title VII appeals, Professor
Kennedy has argued as follows:
In essence, review by the CIT of these various administrative
determinations differs little from appellate review of agency
decisions currently conducted by the federal courts of appeals in
cases concerning decisions of the National Labor Relations Board,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, or the
Merit Systems Protection Board. In section 1581(c) cases, CIT
review is upon the administrative record, with the standard of
review generally being whether the agency's decision is supported
by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.
... The type of record sifting which may have to be done by a
reviewing court in international trade cases is certainly no more
complex or difficult than the type of record review which the courts
of appeal face daily in reviewing voluminous agency records
compiled by the National Labor Relations Board or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, for example. The Federal Circuit itself
regularly conducts such record reviews in section 337 and Merit
Systems Protection Board appeals.
In reviewing the antidumping and countervailing duty decisions
of the CIT, moreover, the [Federal Circuit] undertakes its own
independent examination of the agency record, thereby duplicating
the effort of the CIT in these cases. If expeditious and economical
disposition of these cases is the desiderata, it is questionable
whether two-tiered appellate review as a matter of right is the
appropriate means to this end.25'
248. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677c(b) (1994) (stating that agency hearings required or permitted in
AD or CVD investigations are not subject to APA hearing requirements).
249. Kevin C. Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the U.S. Court of International Trade, 4 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 13, 21-23 (1985).
250. I& at 21-23. Professor Kennedy also focuses on costs and delays attendant two-tier
review, id. at 22, which have been discussed above. See supra notes 228-42 and accompanying
text.
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Professor Kennedy's various criticisms are insufficient to justify
elimination of the CIT. For example, the criticism that the CIT and
Federal Circuit two-tier review constitutes a duplication of effort can
be addressed easily by having the Federal Circuit apply a different
standard of review.25
In addition, the analogy drawn to the Federal Circuit's review in
section 337 and MSPB cases is inapt. These types of cases are
significantly distinguishable from Title VII cases. The most notable
difference is that, in section 337 and MSPB cases, an evidentiary
hearing is available at the lower level, whereas it is not available in
Title VII cases.252 Thus, in Title VII cases, the "record sifting" that
the CIT performs (and that the Federal Circuit would need to
perform if CIT review were eliminated) is very different from the
record sifting that the Federal Circuit is required to perform in
section 337 and MSPB cases.2
3
a) Title VII distinguished from section 337 cases
Under section 337, an ALJ is required to conduct an evidentiary
hearing, pursuant to the parameters set forth in the APA.Y Present
and participating at the hearing will be the complainant and its
counsel, respondents and their counsel, and a staff attorney from the
ITC's Office of Unfair Import Investigations. 5 Typically, a section
337 hearing before an ALJ can last two weeks, during which live
witnesses testify and are subject to cross-examination. 256  The ALJ
251. In adverse action cases brought under 5 U.S.C. ch. 75, for example, the MSPB applies
a preponderance of the evidence standard of review, and the Federal Circuit applies a
substantial evidence standard of review. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c) (1) (B) (1994).
252. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (stipulating that § 337 determinations "shall be made on
the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with [the APA]") and
Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 774 n.5 (1985) (holding that MSPB appellants are entitled to
evidentiary hearing) with 19 U.S.C. § 1677c(b) (1994) (exempting DOG and ITC from APA
hearing requirements in Title VII investigations).
253. Another alternative is to make Title VII investigations APA proceedings before an ALJ,
thereby obviating the need for review by the CIT. See Proceedings, supra note 217, 131 F.R.D.
at 314 (comments of David M. Cohen, Dep't ofJustice counsel) (forecasting increased use of
administrative reviews). Title VII (particularly the CVD law), however, historically has been
viewed as part of this country's arsenal of trade policy statutes. Accordingly, to make Title VII
proceedings subject to the APA and formal adjudications thereunder would be to alter
fundamentally their character. Hence, the viability of such an alternative is questionable, given
the century or so old traditional view of the AD and CVD laws.
254. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c).
255. See id. § 210.36(d) (setting forth rights of every party to fair hearing) and § 210.3
(defining "party" as complainant, respondent, intervenor or ITC investigative attorney).
256. See id. § 210.36(d) (regarding right to present evidence and cross examination); Certain
Diltiazem Hydrochloride and Diltiazem Preparations, USITC Pub. 2902, Inv. No. 337-TA-349,
at 3 (June 1995) (referring to evidentiary hearing which commenced on Oct. 17, 1994 and
concluded on Nov. 3, 1994).
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also rules on the admissibility of hundreds (if not thousands) of
documentary and physical exhibits. 7 Further, the ALJ is required
to render an initial determination ("ED"), which must contain findings
of fact and conclusions of law. It is not unusual for the ID to be 100-
200 pages in length.258
This type of formal adjudication in section 337 cases (which is quite
similar to a patent infringement trial in federal district court)," 9 is
very different from the informal decision-making process of the DOC,
or the non-evidentiary procedures of the ITC in Title VII cases. The
mechanism providing for direct judicial review of section 3837
determinations by the Federal Circuit, therefore, comports with
conventional wisdom regarding conservation of judicial resources.
Conversely, the two-tiered structure of judicial review for Title VII
cases also fits logically within the framework for review of agency
decision-making.
Indeed, as others have commented:
A system by which agency decisions are appealable directly to a
court of appeals presupposes that the agency's procedures afford
adverse parties an opportunity to create an adequate administrative
record, so that the court may decide on the basis of such record
whether the agency's decision was effected through improper
procedures, was arbitrary and capricious, or was not based upon
substantial evidence."W
257. See Certain Microsphere Adhesives, Process For Making Same, and Products Containing
Same, Including Self-Stick Repositionable Notes, USITO Pub. 2949, Inv. No. 337-TA-366 (Jan.
1996) (referencing parties' exhibits numbered in hundreds).
258. The ID becomes the decision of the ITC unless the Commission takes further action.
See 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(h) (2) (1995) (stating that ID concerning issue of violation of § 337
becomes determination of ITC 45 days after date of service of ID, unless full Commission orders
review of ID). The ID, however, may be reviewed de novo by the full Commission based on a
petition for review, id. § 210.43, or sua sponte id. § 210.44. Upon review, the Commission may
affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand the ID, in whole or in part, and may supplement
the ID with its own decision. Id. § 210.45(c). Thus, the ITC decisions that the Federal Circuit
reviews in § 337 cases may be opinions and findings of fact of the full Commission, opinions and
findings of fact of an ITC ALJ, or some combination of the two.
When the Federal Circuit reviews a determination made under § 337, it is theoretically
irrelevant whether the determination being reviewed is that of the ALJ or of the full
Commission. Because the full Commission can essentially conduct a de novo review if it so
chooses, whatever findings the full Commission makes (if any), coupled with whatever findings
of the ALJ are left intact, constitute the determination of the ITC, which is what is subject to
Federal Circuit review.
259. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, Statement ofAdministrative
Action, at 704-07, eprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 4040, 4075 (amending § 337 of Tariff Act of
1930 and Title 28 of U.S. Code in order to bring procedures in § 337 cases further into
conformity with district court procedures).
260. Richard C. Johnson & Richard G. Stoll, Jr., Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals
and Other Adverse Actions, 57 CORNELL L REv. 178, 189 (1972).
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The opportunities to refine adequately the administrative records in
Title VII proceedings generally are not present at the agency level.
As former U.S. Court of Appeals Circuit Judge Malcolm Wilkey has
testified before the House Ways and Means Committee regarding
Title VII cases:
United States administrative agency action needs judicial review.
With all due deference to the International Trade Administration
of the Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission, their determinations might be classified as the "raw product."
Experienced appellate courts know where to look for flaws. The
United States' courts know to what standard it is reasonable to hold
the agency. The courts keep the agencies in line by refining the raw
product of the administrative process in case after case.21
In Title VII cases, there is no trier-of-fact who is charged with
weighing evidence and otherwise conducting an evidentiary hearing
in accordance with the APA.262  The bulk of the record is created
through the written submissions of parties (or any interested persons)
during the administrative proceeding.26 While factual submissions
must be certified,2' authentication (as occurs during an evidentiary
hearing) is not required .2 ' Also included in the record are govern-
261. Accession of Chile to NAF7TA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 770 (1995) (testimony of Malcolm R. Wilkey, U.S. Circuit
Judge (Ret.) and Ambassador of the United States (Ret.)) (emphasis added). As mentioned
below with respect to proceedings under the FA, Judge Wilkey was a panelist on the Softwood
Lumber extraordinary challenge committee reviewing agency action under Title VII. See infra
notes 356-62 and accompanying text (discussingJudge Wilkey's opinion in Softwood Lumbercase).
262. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(f) (2), (3) (providing for option of hearing in DOG AD
investigation, to be chaired by, e.g., a Deputy Assistant Secretary or a division director, but
restating inapplicability of APA hearing procedures and emphasizing that "[w]itness testimony,
if any, shall not be under oath or subject to cross-examination by another interested party or
wimess"); id. § 355.38(f)(2), (3) (providing for identical hearing procedures in DOC CVD
investigation); id. § 207.15 (stipulating that in ITC preliminary investigation, Director of Office
of Operations "shall conduct such investigation as he deems appropriate," shall hold
"conference" if Director deems it "appropriate," and shall serve as presiding officer at
conference); id. § 207.23 (directing that in ITC final investigation, "[t] he Commission shall hold
a hearing," but warning that hearing shall not be subject to APA formal hearing procedures).
263. See id. § 353.38(b) (stating that, in DOG AD investigation hearing, interested party may
make "an affirmative presentation only on arguments included in that party's case brief and may
make a rebuttal presentation only on arguments included in that party's rebuttal brief'); id.
§ 355.38(b) (providing identical requirement for DOC GVD investigation hearing); id. § 207.23
(ITC rule stating that each party must limit its presentation at hearing to summary of
information and arguments contained in its pre-hearing brief, plus information not available at
time party filed its pre-hearing brief).
264. See id. § 353.31(i) (setting forth certification requirements for DOC AD investigations);
id. § 355.31(i) (establishing certification procedures for DOG GVD investigations); id. § 207.3(a)
(stating certification requirements for submitting factual information in ITC Title VII
investigations).
265. The agencies may conduct verifications to spot-check the accuracy of submitted
information, but a verification of all information is not required and indeed, in many instances,
is not conducted. See id. § 353.36(a) (1) (iv), (v) (providing for DOC verification in ordinary AD
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ment memoranda pertaining to the case, in particular, internal DOC
memoranda involving the discussion of factual and legal matters upon
which the agency must take specific action.2" Very often, however,
access to such memoranda is unavailable until the record is compiled
for appeal, because, in practice, the agency does not always promptly
place internal memoranda in the official record nor is it required to
serve the affected parties therewith.267 Furthermore, during the
course of the administrative proceeding, a complete index of the
record is unavailable.2" Hence, it is not until the agencies file their
records (or indices thereof) with the CIT that a formal record actually
becomes available to the parties.269 Moreover, particularly with
regard to DOC proceedings, the official record index often is missing
critical items.27° Finally, during the administrative proceeding,
certain confidential information may not be available to the parties,
even under administrative protective order.7 1 Accordingly, a fully
indexed formal and "complete" record is available to the parties for
the first time only during an appeal before the CIT.272
Further, while hearings are held before both the ITC and DOC in
Title VII cases, these hearings are not in the nature of a trial.
Although witnesses are sworn before the ITC, at the DOC, a hearing
administrative review only in certain situations); id. § 355.36(a) (1) (iv), (v) (providing for
optional DOC verification in ordinary GVD administrative review); id. § 353.36(a) (2) (stating,
in DOG AD investigation, when it is "impractical to verify relevant factual information for each
person, the Secretary may select and verify a sample"); id. § 355.36(a) (2) (providing parallel
sampling option in DOG CVD investigation); id. § 207.4(b) (granting ITC discretion to verify
information received).
266. Id § 353.3(a) (DOG AD proceeding); id. § 355.3(a) (DOG GVD proceeding); see id.
§ 207.21 (directing ITC Director of Operations to prepare and place prehearing staff report in
record prior to hearing in final phase of Title VII injury investigations).
267. See, e.g., ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, supra note 239, at ch. 2, 18 (describing procedures for
maintaining and compiling record and acknowledging that documents may need to be placed
in record after administrative process is complete); Order, U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade (Oct. 20, 1995)
(responding to budget emergency at ITC and requiring ist of documents to be submitted to CIT
and parties rather than actual record and also requiring ITC, upon request, to provide to parties
documents not previously provided during administrative proceeding).
268. ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, supra note 239, at ch. 18, 2 (indexing of record by case analyst
in preparation for litigation); Order, supra note 267.
269. SeeCr. INT'L TRAE R. 71(a), (b) (providing procedures whereby defendant agency, in
case governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), is to file with CIT complete official record of contested
investigation or index of documents thereto).
270. It is not uncommon for parties to supplement their briefs to the CIT with their own file
copies of documents that unquestionably were submitted to the agency and are part of the
record, but have been omitted from the index of the record filed with the CIT.
271. For instance, in the administrative proceeding, access to data underAPO may be limited
to data submitted only by certain parties.
272. On appeal, parties may obtain access under ajudicial protective order to the entire
record, including the confidential data of other parties to which they did not have access during
the administrative proceeding. See Protective Order, Ct. No. 93-08-00506 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct.
14, 1993) (granting access to full administrative record).
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essentially consists of nothing more than arguments by counsel,
limited by the contents of their briefs.273
The decisions resulting from Title VII proceedings are also not like
the conclusions of law, findings of fact, and opinion of a trier-of-fact.
The DOG renders its formal decision through a series of approval
signatures in the departmental chain of command.Y The decision
takes the form of a recitation of party comments, followed by the
agency position. 75 At the ITC, the Commissioners issue a Title VII
decision after a vote is taken. 6 The final determination consists of
a public Commission opinion and/or individual Commissioners'
views, accompanied by a detailed confidential economic report.
277
While a public version of the latter is available, the facts critical to the
agency's determination are usually kept confidential.
Thus, while appeals from agency action in section 337 investigations
go directly to the Federal Circuit without review by the CIT or any
other intermediate body, the differences between the procedures
followed at the agency level in section 337 and those followed in Title
VII cases are numerous and significant. While an ALJ presides over
the making of the record in a section 337 case, no comparable arbiter
exists in a Title VII proceeding until the case gets before the CIT. As
such, without the safeguards of formal adjudication, 278 it would be
273. See supra notes 262-63 (citing DOG and ITC regulations concerning limited nature of
hearings).
274. See ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, supra note 239, at ch. 12 (describing approval process for
preliminary and final AD determinations).
275. E.g., Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Large Newspaper
Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassembled, from Japan,
61 Fed. Reg. 38,139 (Dep't Commerce 1996) (final determination); Antifriction Bearings (Other
than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, et al.; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial Termination of Administrative Reviews, and
Revocation in Part of Antidumping Duty Orders, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,900 (Dep't Commerce 1995)
(final results).
276. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (1994).
277. Ferrosilicon from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. 2606, Inv. No. 731-TA-
567 (Mar. 1993); Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan and the
Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2383, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-458 and 459 (May 1991).
278. The CIT's review of the agencies' determinations functions to ensure that certain
evidentiary and due process standards are adhered to by the agencies in their investigations.
It is not unusual for parties to raise on appeal to the CIT evidentiary-type issues. For example,
the CIT has decided questions involving the DOC's use of best information available ("BIA")
(which acts much like an adverse factual inference) against a party in an AD or CVD proceeding
where the DOG has determined that the party has not submitted adequate information. SeeSKF
USA Inc. v. United States, No. 95-16, slip. op. (Ct Int'l Trade Feb. 8, 1995) (rejecting DOC's
use of BIA when DOG did not request missing information). Further, where the DOG has
obtained and used factual information in a manner contrary to its own regulations, the CIT has
required the agency to recalculate the dumping margin without the use of the improperly
obtained data. SeeTehnoimportexport v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 1169, 1177 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1991) (rejecting DOG's unauthorized use of another respondent's confidential packing data in
DOG's calculation of surrogate data for Romanian respondent, as unlawful and contrary to
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imprudent to eliminate the layer ofjudicial review performed by the
CIT in AD and CVD cases.
In fact, because of their formal adjudicatory nature, it is perhaps
more appropriate to compare section 337 cases (and review thereof)
with proceedings in the area of intellectual property law, rather than
with Title VII proceedings. Such an analysis reveals that the ITC's
section 337 determinations, like other intellectual property decisions,
are, following a trial or hearing, 79 subject to a single tier of non-
discretionary judicial review.280 The standard of review applied to
the ITC's final determinations under section 337, however, is perhaps
more deferential than the standard applied to the district courts in
patent infringement proceedings.28' That is, while ITC findings of
fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard,2 82 a
agency's regulations and policy).
The CIT also has reviewed the ITC's weighing of factors to determine whether injury to a
domestic industry has occurred or is threatened by certain imports in an AD or CVD case. See
Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 322 (Ct Int'l Trade 1992). Additionally, the CIT
has judged the overall "fairness" of the DOC's use of its investigative powers. See Shikoku
Chemicals Corp. v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 417 (Ct Int'l Trade 1992) (rejecting new DOC
methodology that was more accurate, when party had justifiably relied on old methodology).
279. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (stating that determinations under § 337 are made on record after
notice and opportunity for hearing).
280. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (specifying that review of § 337 determinations rests with Federal
Circuit).
281. The standards of review for § 337 cases are statutorily mandated; 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
references Chapter 7 of Title V with regard to the standard of review to be applied by the
Federal Circuit. The APA articulates the scope of review as follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;,
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
282. As to most decisions in a § 337 investigation, because a formal hearing is conducted
pursuant to the provisions of the APA, the Federal Circuit reviews factual findings of the ITC
under the substantial evidence standard. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n,
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district court's findings are reviewed for clear error.28 Similarly,
while questions of law are reviewed de novo in both fora, the ITC is
entitled to Chevron deference"s  while a district court is not.2"
Given the expertise of the ITC in addressing complicated intellectual
property issues, according substantial deference to the agency is a
sensible result.286 However, because section 337 investigations are
conducted like district court trials and subject to a single tier of
judicial review, it is clear that Title VII cases cannot be treated in the
54 F.3d 756, 759-60 (Fed. Cir. 1995). However, not all aspects of a § 337 proceeding are
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (stipulating terms of
Federal Circuit review of various ITC actions in connection with § 337 investigations);
Rosemount, Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n, 910 F.2d 819, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that decisions granting or denying temporary relief are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard). The Federal Circuit reviews questions of law in § 337 cases de novo. Checkpoin4 54
F.3d at 760.
283. See Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The
Federal Circuit also hears appeals from the Trademark Board under the dearly erroneous
standard as to findings of fact. In re Etablissements Darty et Fis, 759 F.2d 15, 18 (Fed. Cir.
1985);Joseph & Feiss Co. v.Joseph Kanner Hat Co., 337 F.2d 1014, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The
Federal Circuit applies a de novo standard, however, as to questions of law. Seegenerally Richard
L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit's Standard of Review, 40 AM. U. L.
Rxv. 1221 (1991) (arguing that Federal Circuit's de novo review of likelihood of confusion issues
should be reconciled with its own application of dearly erroneous standard to other trademark
law issues). Similarly, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is reviewed by the Federal
Circuit under the clearly erroneous and de novo standards. In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942, 945
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (question of law reviewed de novo); In re Carlson, 938 F.2d 1032, 1033 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (question of fact reviewed for clear error).
284. See Farrel Corp. v. International Trade Comm'n, 949 F.2d 1147, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("While this court generally reviews ITC interpretations of statutory provisions de novo, some
deference to constructions by the agency charged with its administration may be appropriate,
particularly if technical issues requiring some expertise are involved." (citing, inter alia, Chevron,
U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984); Coming Glass
Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
285. The deference principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chevron is limited to
agency action because, when a statutory provision is unclear, it is presumed that Congress
delegated certain authority to the agency to fill the gap. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, at 15-16 ("In the administrative law setting, de novo review
now seems ruled by the application of principles of great deference.").
286. Indeed, even the district courts themselves have recognized the expertise of the ITC.
See Aluminum Houseware Co., Inc. v. Chip Clip Corp., 609 F. Supp. 358, 363 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
("[T]he 1TC is in a better position to investigate the facts and address and resolve [patent
infringement] issues. The expertise of the 1TC in patent matters, such as the present one,
provides for a fairer and certainly more knowledgeable forum in which the parties can present
their cases."). Recognition of the ITC's expertise is also apparent in the willingness of courts
to grant preclusive effect to certain ITC decisions. At least one district court has given
preclusive effect to the ITC's findings of fact in a patent-based case. See In re Convertible Rowing
Exerciser Patent Litig., 814 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (D. Del. 1993) (holding that court would not
give res judicata effect to ITC legal determinations relating to patent invalidity, but would give
preclusive effect to ITCfactualfindings); see also Glasstech, Inc. v. AB Kyro Oy, 635 F. Supp. 465,
468 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (acknowledging that ITC finding of patent validity in § 337 proceeding
was not preclusive, but stating that it was proper to draw an inference based on ITC decision
as to probability of plaintiffs success on merits). Moreover, in trademark cases (unlike in patent
cases), because Tide 28 does notvest exclusivejurisdiction in trademark matters with the district
courts, courts will grant resjudicata effect to ITC decisions as to both legal and factual issues.
Union Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1985).
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same manner. Title VII proceedings are simply too far removed
procedurally from the formal adjudicative protections of a district
court-type trial to be subject to immediate appeal to the Federal
Circuit.
b) Title VII distinguished fiom MSPB cases
The review process involving MSPB cases also does not support the
proposition that the CIT should be eliminated. Rather, the MSPB
process highlights two points. First, as recognized by many commen-
tators, the availability of an evidentiary hearing is a key factor to
consider in determining whether a single-tier or a two-tier structure
of judicial review is desirable.287 Second, the MSPB process, when
contrasted to the Title VII process, illustrates why the Federal Circuit's
Atlantic Sugar approach in Title VII cases is unnecessary.
The MSPB reviews agency actions affecting the employment of
federal employees."a  A federal employee adversely affected by a
final order or decision of the MSPB may obtain judicial review of the
order or decision in the Federal Circuit."9 In addition, the MSPB
reviews decisions of the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM")
affecting the retirement of federal employees.2" Private parties
adversely affected by MSPB decisions in such cases may seek review
before the Federal Circuit and the government also may petition for
review of an MSPB decision.
291
The Federal Circuit's standard of review over MSPB decisions is
governed by statute, which states in pertinent part:
In any case filed in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the court shall review the record and hold unlawful and set aside
any agency action, findings, or conclusions found to be-
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regula-
tion having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence;
287. Johnson & Stroll, supra note 260, at 189; David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial
Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1975).
288. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (1) (1994).
289. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction does not apply when a federal discharge action
includes claims of discrimination. Such cases must be brought initially in the federal district
courts, in the manner provided by various civil rights statutes. Congress excepted cases involving
complaints of discrimination from the purview of § 7703 in order to protect the existing rights
of employees to trial de novo in discrimination cases. Id. § 7703(b) (2).
290. See id. § 1204(a) (4) (stating that MSPB shall review OPM rules and regulations).
291. Id. § 7703(a)(1), (d).
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except in the case of discrimination brought under any section
referred to in subsection (b) (2) of this section, the employee or
applicant shall have the right to have the facts subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.12
Hence, in appeals from decisions of the MSPB, the Federal Circuit
applies a statutory standard of review quite similar to the standard
applied in AD and CVD cases.293 One significant difference is that
in MSPB cases, the statute specifies that such a standard is to be
applied by the Federal Circuit. 94 In Tide VII cases, the statute
dictates that such a standard be applied by the CIT, and is silent as to
the standard to be applied by the Federal Circuit. Accordingly, in its
review of MSPB cases, the Federal Circuit has no choice but to apply
the statutory standard of review. In Tide VII cases, by its silence,
Congress has given the Federal Circuit a choice.
Also noteworthy is the fact that Congress has specified the standard
of review that the MSPB is to apply at the administrative level.295
Depending on the type of case, the statutory standard dictates that the
MSPB may not sustain agency action that is unsupported by a
preponderance of the evidence 96 or by substantial evidence. 97
In addition, the MSPB may not sustain agency action that involves
harmful procedural error, is based on a prohibited personnel
292. Id. § 7703(c).
293. Although a provision like subpart (c) (2) is not present vis-A-vis AD and CVD cases, when
either the rTC or the DOC is alleged to have failed to follow a rule or regulation or procedure
required by law, litigants have claimed such conduct not to be in accordance with law. See, e.g.,
Kemira Fibres Oyv. United States, 61 F.3d 866, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiff must
establish it was prejudiced by DOC's failure to comply in timely manner with its own regulation
as to notice requirement for administrative reviews); Creswell Trading Co. v. United States, 15
F.3d 1054, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (criticizing "inherent procedural unfairness" in DOC action of
taking position that certain information was irrelevant during initial investigation and then, after
deadline for submitting such information had passed, declaring that information was so vital to
using respondent's data that without it, DOC had to base decision on "best information
available"). Thus, the standard set forth at subpart (c) (1) would subsume conduct coming
within the purview of subpart (c) (2). Likewise, although the arbitrary and capricious/abuse of
discretion portion of (c) (1) is not present in the standard of review for most Title VII cases,
when an abuse of agency discretion is shown, the Federal Circuit will not uphold the agency
action (presumably because an abuse of discretion constitutes conduct not in accordance with
law). See NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 74 F.3d 1204, 1208-09 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding
abuse of discretion when agency refused to consider request for correction of clerical errors).
294. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b) (1) (stating that review of board decision must be in Federal Circuit).
295. Id. § 7701(c)(1), (2).
296. See id. § 7701(c) (1) (B) (providing standard for all actions other than those specified
in § 7701(c)(1) (A)).
297. See id. § 7701(c) (1) (A) (providing standard for action based on unacceptable
performance described in § 4303 or removal from Senior Executive Service for failure to be
recertified under § 3393a).
298. Id. § 7701(c)(2)(A).
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practice,2  or is not in accordance with law." Finally, in an
MSPB review proceeding, the appellant is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing."°1 This is significantly different from CIT review of Title VII
cases, which is limited to review upon the agency record."0 2
In MSPB adverse action cases under chapter 75, while the Federal
Circuit applies a substantial evidence standard of review to the initial
agency action,"03 the MSPB, in the first step of the review process,
applies a preponderance of the evidence standard0 4 after an
evidentiary hearing."0 ' Thus, in these cases there is no redundancy
as to the role of the two reviewing bodies or as to the standards of
review which they apply.
In actions based on unacceptable performance brought under
chapter 43, Congress appears to have created a certain redundancy in
that both the MSPB and the Federal Circuit are required to apply the
substantial evidence test. o However, because the MSPB conducts
an evidentiary hearing and the Federal Circuit is required to review
the record,0 7 which includes the record taken as a whole, 03 the
two bodies are not statutorily charged with identical tasks. The MSPB
acts like a trial court and reaches a decision that, based on the
evidence presented by an aggrieved employee, may or may not
uphold the initial agency action. Assuming the agency action is
upheld,09 the Federal Circuit will review the initial agency action to
determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence, in light of
all the evidence presented, including any new evidence presented
299. See id § 7701(c)(2)(B) (referring to prohibited personnel practices described in 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)).
300. Id. § 7701(c)(2)(C).
301. Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 774 n.5 (1985).
302. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (2) (1994) (defining what constitutes the record for review);
see also id. § 1516a(a) (2) (discussing review of determination on record).
303. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(3).
304. Id. § 7701(c)(1)(B).
305. See Lindah4 470 U.S. at 774 n.5 (stating that appellant in MSPB review proceeding is
entitled to evidentiary hearing).
306. Compare5 U.S.C. § 7701 (c) (1) (A) (stating that MSPB shall sustain agency decision only
if it is supported by substantial evidence in cases based on unacceptable performance described
in § 4303) with id. § 7703(c) (3) (stating that Federal Circuit shall set aside any agency action,
findings, or conclusions found to be unsupported by substantial evidence).
307. Id. § 7703(c).
308. Hayes v. Department of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
309. If the MSPB overturns the agency action, the employee presumably is no longer
aggrieved and accordingly, has no right to appeal before the Federal Circuit. Thus, there would
be no appeal to the Federal Circuit, unless OPM appeals on policy grounds. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(d) (stating that OPM may obtain review of any MSPB decision if OPM Director
determines that MSPB erred in interpreting civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting
personnel management and that decision will have substantial impact on civil service law, rule,
regulation, or policy directive). Under the latter circumstance, however, such an appeal would
not likely implicate the substantial evidence test.
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before the MSPB.Y° Hence, as to the supplemented record, there
lies only one appeal, not two. As such, while the standard of review
may be the same, it is applied in an appellate context (as opposed to
a trial context) only once, not twice, as is the case in Title VII appeals,
where the CIT conducts no evidentiary hearing."' These various
differences demonstrate that parallels cannot properly be drawn
between MSPB and section 337 cases on the one hand, and Title VII
cases on the other.
c. Other alternatives
i. Three-judge CIT panels
At the CIT's Sixth Judicial Conference, one participant noted that
the solution for elimination of redundant reviews might be to have
panels of three judges from the CIT review Title VII agency deci-
sions.1 2 Under such a system, there would be no appeal to the
Federal Circuit. Instead, an appeal would have to be by writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. As outlined at the conference:
The potential for significant delay is quite obvious. In that regard,
I think it is fair to dispassionately consider, namely whether we
need a two-tier judicial review mechanism. Indeed, I would argue
that the existence of a two-tier mechanism encourages the agencies
only to adhere to generally applicable instructions only if those
instructions are issued by the CAFC. My own view of what should
happen is that the CIT should have the exclusive jurisdiction with
no right of appeal to the CAFC. I also would have the CIT sitting
in three-judge panels to cut off any belief on the part of the
agencies that they will get a better opinion out of another individu-
al judge on the CIT."'
310. The Federal Circuit has explained:
The statute in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) refers ambiguously to this court's review of 'agency
action' to determine if it is supported by 'substantial evidence.' In view of the de novo
nature of the proceeding before the MSPB, this court has concluded that it must
review the agency action based on the record made to the MSPB and the MSPB
findings, rather than review the agency action solely on the basis of the agency's
record.
Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 768 F.2d 1325, 1329 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
311. See Cr. INT'L TRADE R. 56.2 (outlining usual procedure for judgment in AD/CVD-
related CIT actions governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) based on motion for judgment on agency
record).
312. Proceedings, supra note 217, at 241 (comments of Leonard M. Shambon).
313. Proceedings, supra note 217, at 241 (comments of Leonard M. Shambon); accord
Shambon, supra note 105, at 41-42 (arguing that "necessity forjudicial review by both the CIT
and the Federal Circuit must be dispassionately assessed" because of "potential for significant
delay of finaljudicial dispositions").
THE AMEPICAN UNmVERSrY LAW REvImW [Vol. 45:1749
The suggestion that three-judge panels of the CIT hear Title VII
appeals with no right of appeal to the Federal Circuit has some merit,
but on balance seems a less workable solution than application by the
Federal Circuit of a different standard of review. The three-judge
panel suggestion has the obvious effect of eliminating two-tierjudicial
review. Most commentators, however, suggest that if a layer is to be
eliminated, it should be the district court tier of review rather than
the appellate court tier. 14
The suggestion also would relieve the appellate court of the burden
of performing functions more appropriately performed by a district
court. Nevertheless, it would burden the CIT with conducting its
review in Title VII cases in a way that is not its "normal way" of doing
business. The CIT normally does not sit in three-judge panels.
Three-judge panels, by rule, are reserved for cases involving issues of
constitutionality or those with broad or significant implications for the
administration of international trade laws." '1 Hence, in all Title VII
cases, the CIT would be required to operate outside of its normal
parameters, which would likely impose a substantial burden on that
court
As to the worry that single-judge CIT decisions encourage litigants
to seek a better opinion from another judge, because CIT judges
strive to follow each others' precedent,"' this issue is of little
concern. Further, with regard to the agencies' refusal to adhere to
judicial instructions unless they emanate from the Federal Circuit,
314. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 287, at 15-16 ("Single-tier district court review is...
simply unthinkable; only the court of appeals, with its broad territorial jurisdiction and with
judges few enough to keep in step with one another, can maintain a tolerable degree of
uniformity.");Johnson & Stoll, supra note 260, at 193-97 (arguing for direct appellate review in
federal employee discharge cases); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agenty
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IoWA L. REv. 1297, 1315 (1986) (arguing that
one-tier district court review would create "insuperable difficulties").
315. 28 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1994); Cr. INT'L TRADE R. 77(e) (2); National Corn Growers Ass'n
v. Baker, 643 F. Supp. 626, 630 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
316. SeeProceedings, supra note 217, at 306 (comments of HonorableJane A. Restani,Judge
of CIT and panel moderator) ("I ... believe the judges of [the CIT] pay very close attention
to the opinions of their colleagues and try to be consistent when they feel they can be."). But
see James A. Toupin, The U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. International Trade
Commission After Ten Years-A Personal View, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 10, 20-21 (1990) (arguing that
certain "institutional characteristics" of CIT create conflicts in CIT decisions). Moreover, to the
extent that inconsistent opinions by CITjudges are a concern, retaining review by the Federal
Circuit is advisable to resolve any conflicts.
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while this clearly has been a problem in some past cases, 17 whether
it will continue to be an issue is unclear.
First, the Federal Circuit's Camargo panel"' has recently indicated
that unappealed decisions of the CIT "are likely to 'serve as valuable
guides to the rights and obligations of the international trade
community."'3 9 Given such a statement, the agencies may be more
reluctant to refuse to pay heed to the CIT. Indeed, the CIT has itself
begun to demand agency compliance with its orders by indicating that
it will find agencies in contempt of court for non-compliance. 20
Moreover, in several recent cases where the CIT has reversed agency
action and ordered the DOC to implement a different approach, the
agency has complied. 21 Hence, this concern may no longer be of
as great significance as it once was.
In sum, the reasons in favor of three-judge CIT panels are not as
numerous as would appear at first glance. Under such a system, while
redundant review would be eliminated, an increased burden would be
placed on the CIT. Redundant review can be eliminated through
other means, however, without imposing an increased burden on
either the CIT or the Federal Circuit. Finally, as to the issue of
significant delay, it should be noted that the Federal Circuit's usual
disposition of appeals from the CIT is quite expeditious.322 Hence,
review by the Federal Circuit is not generally the cause of substantial
delay.
317. See, e.g., Certain Welded Carbon Steel Standard Pipes and Tubes from India, 57 Fed.
Reg. 54,360 (Dep't Commerce 1992) (final admin. rev.) (DOC not following decision of CIT
with which it disagrees regarding treatment of rebated taxes and measurement of tax incidence
in home market); Tapered Roller Bearings Four Inches or Less in Outside Diameter and Certain
Components Thereof from Japan, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,720 (Dep't Commerce 1990) (final admin.
rev.) (DOG not following decision of CIT regarding treatment of U.S. direct selling expenses).
318. Camargo Correa Metais, SA v. United States, 52 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
319. 1& at 1043 (citing National Corn Growers, 643 F. Supp. at 631).
320. See RHP Bearings v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 933, 935 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
321. For example, the DOG recently complied when it implemented a new methodology for
the calculation of the adjustment for value-added taxes in an antidumping margin calculation.
See Brass Sheet and Strip from Germany, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,542, 38,544 (Dep't Commerce 1995)
(final admin. rev.). Ironically, the Federal Circuit ultimately reversed the CIT on that issue.
Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See also Certain Circular
Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,375, 18,376 (Dep't
Commerce 1996) (amended final admin. rev.) (DOC revised determination of "all others" cash
deposit rate for AD administrative reviews pursuant to CIT decisions).
322. The current average time for disposition of appeals from the CIT is approximately one
year.
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ii. Extraordinary or discretionary review by the Federal Circuit
a) Review proceedings under the FTAINAFTA
As a result of U.S. participation in NAFTAs  and the FTA, 24
the CIT and the Federal Circuit usually do not review final agency
determinations in AD and CVD cases that involve imports from
Canada and Mexico.S"u Under Chapter 19 of both agreements, a
private party has the option of having a final agency determination
reviewed by a binational panel rather than by the CIT. 26 Each
panel consists of five experts in the field of international trade. 27
When a panel reviews an agency's AD or CVD determination, the
panel is required to follow the law of the country whose agency's
decision is at issue. 28 Chapter 19 proceedings are designed so that
panels will have 315 days in which to render their decisions.3 29
Generally, the decisions of binational panels are binding on the
parties.S" If appropriate, however, the government of a participat-
323. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289
(entered into forceJan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFrA].
324. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27
I.L.M. 293 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter F1'A]. Although the FTA is still in
effect, the provisions of NAFrA supersede any FTA provisions inconsistent with NAFTA.
325. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (2) (1994). While Canada and the United States were the only
parties to the FI'A, NAFFA includes Mexico as well. The statute provides for a few instances in
which the CIT may review certain agency determinations covered by the FTA or NAFTA.
Examples include when binational panel review is not requested by any party; when a panel
concludes that the determination is unreviewable by the panel; certain determinations made
pursuant to prior judicial review; when binational panel review or an extraordinary challenge
has been terminated; or when constitutional issues are presented. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (3), (4).
326. Although review under the Chapter 19 system is not mandatory, since the system's
inception the vast majority of appeals involving these countries have been heard by binational
panels. From January 1989 through September 1994, the DOG issued 51 CVD and AD
determinations pertaining to Canadian imports. Of those, 24 decisions were appealed to
binational panels, while only 2 were appealed to the CIT. Similarly, for the same period, the
ITC issued 15 final injury determinations. Seven of those decisions were appealed to binational
panels and only 4 went to the CIT. Thus, there have been some instances where appeals
involving Canadian merchandise have been filed with the CIT. In those cases, appeals from the
CIT would continue to be heard by the Federal Circuit. GEN. AccT. OFFICE, U.S. CANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT-FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CONTROVERSY INAPPEALS OF TRADE REMEDY CASES
TO BINATIONAL PANELS, Pub. No. GAO/GGD-95-175BR, at Briefing § 3 (1995) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
327. SeeS. REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2395,
2432 (discussing panel selection procedures under FTA).
328. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing on the Constitutionality of Establishing a
Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases Before the Sen.
Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1988) [hereinafter Binational Panel Hearing]
(statement ofJean Anderson, DOC counsel).
329. See In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1859, 1863
(ECC 1991) (noting mandate that panels render their decision within 315 days of hearing).
330. SeeS. REP. No. 509, supra note 327, at 34, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2429 (noting
that binational panel decision will be binding with respect to matter before panel, but that panel
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ing country may request review of a panel decision by an extraordi-
nary challenge committee ("EGG").331 Each EGG consists of three
experienced judges.332 Unlike panels, ECCs have an abbreviated
period of only ninety days in which to reach a decision."' Although
the ECCs are designed to fill the role played by the Federal Circuit,
the committees are not intended to function as normal courts of
appeal."M To this end, the drafters of the FTA narrowly defined the
grounds for appealing binational panel decisions. Therefore, only in
the most extreme instances will panel decisions be reviewed by an
EG335ECG. S
The creation of this unique system of dispute resolution was the by-
product of compromise. The negotiations surrounding the FTA were
exhaustive and, near their conclusion, Canada and the United States
found themselves with only a short period of time left to complete
their drafting of the agreement. 36 A particularly vexing area of the
negotiations was whether the FTA should include provisions to
combat unfair trade practices.337 The Canadian negotiators argued
that such measures were not appropriate for countries that were
about to create and enter into a free trade area.3  In addition, the
Canadian government sought to limit the application of U.S. trade
laws to Canadian exports because the Canadians believed previous
adverse decisions by the DOC and the ITC had been influenced by
decision will have only non-binding persuasive effect on U.S. courts adjudicating other cases).
331. See NAFrA, supra note 323, art. 1904(13) (listing prerequisites for obtaining ECC
review).
332. NAFrA, supra note 323, art. 1904(13) (1). Although the judges named to an ECC need
not be active jurists, the agreements require that they come from federal benches or the
equivalent thereof in their respective countries. Id.
333. NAFIA, supra note 323, art. 1904(13) (2).
334. See S. REP. No. 509, supra note 327, at 39-40, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2434
(stating that United States or Canada may use ECC procedure "if it alleges, among other things,
that a member of a binational panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious conflict
of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct"); In reFresh, Chilled, or Frozen
Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.RD. (BNA) 1863, 1861 (ECC 1991) (explaining that ECC review
procedure departs from role of normal appellate courts).
335. See In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1861
(emphasizing that ECC review is granted only in "extraordinary" circumstances).
336. See Binational Panel Hearing, supra note 328, at 70 (statement of Jean Anderson, DOC
counsel) ("Despite intense negotiations, it proved impossible to reach an agreement in the short
time frame of FTA negotiations.").
337. See Binational Panel Hearing, supra note 328, at 63-64 (statement ofJean Anderson, DOG
counsel) (admitting that although key Canadian objective was to take new approach to unfair
trade practices, U.S. officials were unwilling to replace current laws in effect in international
trade arena).
338. See Binational Panel Hearing, supra note 328, at 63 (statement of Jean Anderson, DOG
counsel) (describing Canadian view that U.S. unfair trade laws ran counter to goal of free
international trade).
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politics and strong domestic lobbies.3 9 The U.S. contingent dis-
agreed, arguing that it was imperative that trade remedies be included
in the FTA.34 Furthermore, it refused to exempt Canadian prod-
ucts from U.S. CVD and AD laws because of a belief that the
Canadian government was heavily subsidizing many of the country's
industries. 1  Faced with a limited amount of time and realizing
that the two countries would not be able to harmonize their trade
remedy laws, the negotiators settled on the binational panel review
process.' In this manner, they ensured that the laws of the
respective countries would continue to be applied until agreement on
the outstanding issues could be reached. 43
Despite the contentious negotiations that led to creation of the
binational panel system, both sides shared some common expectations
of what they believed the system could achieve. These goals included
protecting each country's sovereignty, increasing trade benefits,
reducing political tensions in trade disputes, and having a fair and
expedited review process. Whether all of these laudable goals have
been met is far from clear. Nevertheless, AD and CVD determina-
tions that involve Canadian and Mexican imports generally continue
to bypass review by the CIT and the Federal Circuit in favor of
binational panel review.'
This alternative dispute resolution mechanism unquestionably was
spawned by a political process and accordingly cannot be said to yield
politically neutral results. As such, outside the context of a negotiated
free trade agreement, its viability is unlikely. Thus, the panel process
is not herein raised as an alternative to the current normal appellate
339. See H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 4 (1988) (noting that in course
of negotiations Canadians referred specifically to U.S. GVD investigation against softwood
lumber in 1986).
340. See Binational Panel Hearing, supra note 328, at 63 (statement of Jean Anderson, DOG
counsel) (alluding to U.S. sentiment that FrA should encompass enforcement provisions for
unfair trade practices).
341. See Binational Panel Hearing, supra note 328, at 63 (statement of Jean Anderson, DOG
counsel) (noting that United States refused to capitulate to Canadian demands that Canada be
exempted from U.S. GVD law).
342. See H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 339, at 63 (indicating that parties reached
compromise by focusing on binational panel adjudication of FrA disputes).
343. The binational panel system was originally intended to be experimental in nature until
such time as the countries could decide whether trade remedy laws were needed in the FTA.
SeeS. REP. No. 509, supra note 327, at 40, reprinted in 1988 U.S.G.GA.N. at 2435 (explaining that
art. 1906 of FTA provides that ch. 19 dispute settlement provisions shall be in effect for 5 years,
with possible 2-year extension, pending development of substitute system of AD and GVD rules
for parties, and providing that failure of parties to agree on new system within 7 years would
allow either country to terminate FTA on 6-month notice). Nevertheless, when the parties
drafted NAFTA, the panel process was made permanent.
344. SeeGAO REPORT, supra note 826, at Briefing section III (providing numerical tabulation
of agency decisions appealed to panel rather than to GIT).
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structure. Rather, the debate surrounding the effectiveness of panel
review proceedings is used as a vehicle for analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of some different alternative solutions. In particular,
because it is a highly discretionary level of review, the second tier of
review within the Chapter 19 system is relevant to a consideration of
whether discretionary appellate review in other Title VII cases would
be advisable.
As discussed above, under certain narrowly defined conditions,
governments may appeal panel decisions to ECCs.5" Unlike in the
first level of review before a panel, the standard of review applied by
an ECC is always the same regardless of the parties involved. 6
Review by an ECC therefore does not track U.S. law regarding the
second tier of review.
Indeed, the standard of review used at the second level of the
FTA/NAFTA system is considerably different from the standard used
by the Federal Circuit. At this second level of review, Chapter 19 does
not attempt to incorporate the appellate standards from the
countries' national court systems.'M7 This is because the drafters of
the agreements did not envision ECCs operating as normal courts of
appeal.' Accordingly, Article 1904.13 of Chapter 19 presents the
narrowest of grounds for sustaining extraordinary challenges. In
order for a panel decision to be reviewed by an ECC, the government
making the request must first meet a three-prong test. The first
prong requires that the requesting government allege at least one of
the following:
345. See In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1859, 1861
(ECC 1991) (delineating narrow circumstances in which United States or Canada may seek ECC
review).
346. See id at 1862-63 ("The committee and the panel have separate roles and different
expertise; it is not the function of a committee to conduct a traditional appellate review
regarding the merits of a panel decision.").
347. See NAFTA, supra note 323, art. 1904.13 (listing specific grounds for triggering
establishment of ECC and providing that ECC review does not involve analysis of merits of
panel's decision).
348. The first ECC to be convened described the role of the committee as follows:
As its name suggests, the "extraordinary' challenge procedure is not intended to
function as a routine appeal. Rather the decision of a binational panel may be
challenged and reviewed only in "extraordinary" circumstances. While the legislative
history of the extraordinary challenge committee mechanism is lacking in specifics, it
is clear that the extraordinary challenge procedure is intended solely as "a safeguard
against an impropriety or gross panel error that could threaten the integrity of the
[binational panel review] process."
InreFresh, Chilled, or Frozen Porkfrom Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1861 (quoting Summary
of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, at
37 (Feb. 1988)).
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(i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or
a serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the
rules of conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of
procedure, or
(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority, orjurisdic-
tion set forth in this Article, for example by failing to apply the
appropriate standard of review .... "
If one of these actions can be shown, the requesting government must
next allege that such action "has materially affected the panel's
decision.""' ° Finally, the requesting government must allege that
the panel's action "threatens the integrity of the binational panel
review process."5 1
The standard can be seen as a highly deferential form of discretion-
ary review, which will permit a binational panel decision to stand
unless the decision is so aberrant that it threatens the very integrity
of the review system. Indeed, as the standard has been interpreted by
previous extraordinary challenge committees, an ECC functions only
as a "safety valve" to check the conduct of binational panelists rather
than to review the merits of their legal and factual conclusions. 5 2
In the seven years since the system's inception, only three decisions
have been issued by extraordinary challenge committees, each issued
while the FTA was in effect. 35 In all three instances, the United
States was the party asking for an extraordinary challenge committee
to review the decision of a panel in connection with an investigation
of Canadian merchandise.3 5 Each time, the U.S. request was
rejected with the committee majorities ruling that the standard for
sustaining an extraordinary challenge had not been met.
3 55
349. NAFTA, supra note 323, art. 1904.13(a).
350. NAFTA, supra note 323, art. 1904.13(b).
351. NAFTA, supra note 323, art. 1904.13(b).
352. See In reLive Swine from Canada, 15 I.T.RD. (BNA) 2025,2027 (ECC 1993) ("The ECG
should be perceived as a safety valve in those extraordinary circumstances where a challenge is
warranted to maintain the integrity of the binational panel process.").
353. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Canada, No. ECC 94-1904-01 USA, 1994
WL 405928 (EGG Aug. 3, 1994); In reLive Swine from Canada, 15 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2025; In re
Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1859 (ECC 1991).
354. See supra note 353.
355. See In re Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Canada, 1994 WL 405928, at *28
(rejecting extraordinary challenge where United States failed to establish that panel member
violated standards ofconduct as specified by NAFIA art. 1904.13); In reLive Swine from Canada,
15 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2030-31 (dismissing extraordinary challenge because of United States'
failure to satisfy criteria for reversing panel decision); In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from
Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1865-66 (dismissing extraordinary challenge because state failed
to meet standards set under FTA art. 1904.13).
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Not surprisingly, as a result of these decisions, there has been
intense debate over what role EGGs were intended to perform.
Nowhere is the issue discussed more fervently than in Softwood Lumber
from Canada.5 ' In an extensive and at times caustic dissent, the sole
American member of the committee, Judge Malcolm Wilkey, 57
argued that the U.S. request should have been granted because the
panel decision at issue had reached "egregiously erroneous re-
sults."35 Further, Judge Wilkey stated that he feared the Canadian
majority had ensured that future challenge committees would have
"no role at all" because of the narrow interpretation that had been
given to the review standard.359 He noted that the majority opinion
held that the role of the ECC is not to determine whether the law the
panel applied was "absolutely correct," but merely to determine
"whether the panel conscientiously attempted to apply the appropri-
ate law as they understood it.""6
The Softwood Lumber ECG decision thus echoes some of the debate
that has surrounded the second tier of appellate review in the U.S.
courts, namely, to what extent should the second reviewing body defer
to the decision of the lower reviewing body.3"' Regardless of
whether Judge Wilkey's or the view of the majority in Softwood Lumber
is closer to what the YTA drafters envisioned, it is clear that under the
standard set forth in Article 1904, an administrative agency's determi-
nation normally will not be reviewed by an appellate body. In that
sense, the ECC standard is at the far end of the spectrum of "hands
off' approaches. Furthermore,Judge Wilkey's criticism highlights one
of the difficulties inherent in discretionary/extraordinary review,
namely, that the sharper controversy may be the issue of whether
second-tier reviews should be entertained rather than the merits
presented therein. Finally, the need for adequate appellate guidance
also should not be disregarded as an issue where discretionary review
356. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Canada, 1994 WL 405928, at *45 (Wilkey,
J., dissenting).
357. RetiredJudge Wilkey is a former ChiefJudge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
358. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Canada, 1994 WL 405928, at *74 (Wilkey,
J., dissenting).
359. Id at *45 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
360. i at *78 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinion of Hart, J., at *21).
361. See supra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
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is considered. 62 These and other aspects of discretionary review are
discussed below.
b) Discretionary review by the Federal Circuit
One possible alternative that is discussed increasingly among all
courts of appeal, is the notion of discretionary appellate review.1
6Y
Under such a system, CIT decisions would be reviewed by the Federal
Circuit on a discretionary basis. This approach could itself operate
under two formulae. One approach would give the Federal Circuit
discretion whether to hear a Title VII appeal from the CIT, regardless
of whether the CIT affirmed or reversed the agency's decision. The
other approach would permit CIT decisions adverse to the DOC or
the ITC to remain appealable as a matter of right, but would require
private litigants' appeals to be conducted on a discretionary basis."'
The primary advantage to adopting a discretionary two-tier system
of review in Title VII cases would be the economy the system would
potentially bring to expenditure of the Federal Circuit's resourc-
es.s" Conceivably under such a system, the Federal Circuit would
review only the most significant international trade issues. Lesser
issues would be decided by the CIT and would not be subject to
further judicial review. While this advantage is worthy of consider-
ation, the majority of scholars who have addressed the issue of two-tier
discretionary review have argued that such a system creates more
difficulties than it is worth.36
The most troublesome attribute of a two-tier discretionary review
system is that it introduces an extra step into the judicial process,
namely, a briefing and a determination as to whether leave to appeal
362. The GAO REPORT concluded that another difficulty for binational panels is the fact that,
unlike CIT decisions, panel decisions typically are not subject to subsequent review and
therefore lack appellate guidance in application of the standard of review. GAO REPORT, supra
note 326, at Briefing § 1.
363. See generally Curry & Goodman, supra note 287, at 19 (illuminating concept of
discretionary appellate review of district court opinions); Kathy Lanza, Discretionay Review, in 2
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. WORKING PAPERS AND SUBcOMM. REPORTS (July 1, 1990).
364. SeeHENRYJ. FRiENDLY, FEDERALJURISDICTION: AGENERAL VIEW 176 (1973) (proposing
that double-standard system of review be applied generally to administrative decisions, and
justifying approach based on belief that "it is enough to grant an aggrieved citizen one judicial
look at the action of a disinterested governmental agency, unless a superior judicial body
believes the case presents a problem going beyond a particular instance.").
365. See Curry & Goodman, supra note 287, at 20 (hypothesizing that under discretionary
two-tiered review, appellate courts would review only those cases that involve important legal
issues).
366. See Curry & Goodman, supra note 287, at 21-23 (observing that "the disadvantages of
discretionary review are immediately obvious and weighty"); Legomsky, supra note 314, at 1315
(cautioning against use of two-tier discretionary review).
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should be granted or denied by the appellate court.367 In addition
to the cost and delay attendant to such a screening process, the
standard applied by the Federal Circuit in deciding whether to grant
an appeal would itself likely become a source of controversy.311
Further, by removing litigants' absolute right to appeal to the
Federal Circuit, presumably a larger number of cases ultimately would
be resolved by the CIT. This is generally viewed as a disadvantage of
discretionary review because district courtjudges do not usually sit in
panels. Thus, because each case is decided by a single judge, rather
than by a panel, there exists the potential for greater divergence in
the law.369 Because review of Title VII cases rests only with the CIT
and not with multiple district courts, this is not a significant issue with
regard to Title VII cases.37° Moreover, because CIT judges strive to
follow each others' precedent, again, this particular factor does not
militate strongly against discretionary review. 7
A consideration that does weigh against discretionary review is that
the Title VII cases recently on the Federal Circuit's docket generally
have involved significant legal issues. 72 Additionally, because Title
367. See Curry & Goodman, supra note 287, at 21 (discussing problems created by extra step,
including additional legal fees and additional briefs needing review).
368. See Curry & Goodman, supra note 287, at 20 ("Discretionary review... would require
in every appealed case a determination now required in none: whether to grant or deny leave
to appeal."). The problems that have arisen in the context of discretionary review by EGGs
under the FTA and NAFTA clearly demonstrate the potential for controversy engendered by
such determinations. See supra notes 330-35,345-62 and accompanying text (discussing standard
of review problem for ECC proceedings).
369. See Curry & Goodman, supra note 287, at 12 (recognizing ability of appellate courts
under current scheme to "develop and maintain a uniform and coherent case-law for a large
geographic area").
370. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994) (vesting CIT with exclusive jurisdiction over review of
AD and CVD determinations of DOG and ITC); id. § 1581(f) (vesting CIT with exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes concerning release of information under administrative protective
order in AD and CVD cases); id. § 1581(i) (granting CIT exclusive jurisdiction over residual
international trade-related matters); see also supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (discussing degree of consistency among CIT
judges and adherence to each others' precedents).
372. See, e.g., Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 85 F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (regarding ITC's
determination of like product for purposes of its injury analysis in AD investigation, which was
broader than DOC's determination of class or kind of product in its analysis of pricing);
Torrington Co. v. United States, 82 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (regarding calculation of AD
duties on products imported into U.S. but re-exported prior to sale taking place in U.S. on
which DOG could calculate price, and regarding treatment of certain home market price
adjustments in determination of prices); Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (regarding continuation of subsidy when company to which subsidy was originally granted
is sold); Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (regarding DOG's
obligation to verify information); Torrington Co. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(regarding DOC's methodology for calculating AD assessment rates and deposit rates); Daewoo
Elecs. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (involving several issues related to
treatment of rebated taxes in AD cases under 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1) (C)); Allied-Signal
Aerospace Co. v. United States, 966 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (regarding DOC's newly adopted
methodology for applying adverse inference against party),
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1749
VII cases constitute a minor portion of the Federal Circuit's docket,
there appears to be no true need to reduce further the number by
means of an artificial screening process.s~
As such, when the various points in favor of and against discretion-
ary review by the court of appeals are analyzed in the context of the
realities of Titie VII cases, it seems that discretionary review may not
be the best solution. While eliminating some redundancy, discretion-
ary review would cause additional costs to be incurred and would not
reduce greatly the number of appeals. Appellate judicial resources
can better be conserved through the application of a different review
standard.
III. THE APPELLATE REVIEW PROCESS IN TITLE VII CASES COMPARED
WITH FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVIEW IN OTHER CASES
An analysis of other cases within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
highlights two points relevant to a discussion of the court's approach
to the standard of review in Title VII cases. First, as to questions of
fact, a redundant standard of review exists in almost no other area of
the court's jurisdiction .3 ' The one notable exception, the Federal
Circuit's review of decisions of the Court of Federal Claims reviewing
determinations of special masters in Vaccine Act cases, has generated
a great deal of controversy for the court. 75 Hence, if anything, the
latter types of cases lend further support to the proposition that the
Atlantic Sugar standard should be reevaluated. Second, the proce-
dures surrounding other cases within the Federal Circuit'sjurisdiction,
when compared to Title VII cases, illustrate why certain of the
alternatives that have been suggested in lieu of the Atlantic Sugar
approach are not well-suited for Title VII cases.
The analysis above illustrates the difficulties of drawing parallels to
MSPB cases and section 337 cases. 6 Addressed below are customs
cases and certain other broad categories of Federal Circuit jurisdic-
373. See Curry & Goodman, supra note 287, at 22. Curry and Goodman explain:
[A]gency action is unsuitable for discretionary two-tier review unless two conditions are
met. First, the volume of appeais must be large and burdensome, even after filtration
through the district courts: otherwise, curtailment of the right to appellate review
would not be worth the candle. Second, the proportion of those appeals involving
legal issues or important interests must be very small; otherwise, leave to appeal would
be granted too often to achieve real savings.
374. See supra part ll.C.3.b.ii.
375. See infra notes 439-68 and accompanying text. As discussed below, there are reasons for
distinguishing such cases from Title VII cases. See id.
376. See supra notes 254-311 and accompanying text.
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tion.SU The most significant factors relevant to a discussion of
alternative approaches to be gleaned from these other cases are: (1)
was the underlying administrative proceeding one in which there was
an evidentiary hearing; and (2) if an intermediate level of review
exists, was there de novo review or a trial or evidentiary proceeding
available at the intermediate level. Both of these factors, when
applied to Title VII cases, suggest that although the Atlantic Sugar
approach may be excessively duplicative, an intermediate level of
review nonetheless should be retained, albeit with a different
approach to the second tier of review.
Finally, it is important to note that, as to questions of law, Title VII
cases do not substantially diverge, in theory or in practice, from other
areas of the court's jurisdiction. Because the traditional judicial
approach is for the reviewing court itself to evaluate questions of law,
some degree of redundancy is inherent in any framework where more
than one tier ofjudicial review exists. Even so, Chevron deference to
the agency in many instances will reduce duplicative review. Indeed,
because of Chevron deference, the Federal Circuit may be more likely
to analyze the decision of the CIT to determine whether the lower
court misapplied/misapprehended the standard of review by
substituting its own interpretation for that of the agency.78
A. The Standard of Review Applied by the Federal Circuit in
Customs Cases
The review process for customs cases highlights the somewhat
illogical result obtained in Tide VII cases. In both types of cases, the
CIT is charged with reviewing agency actions or decisions. 9  In
both types of cases, the CIT's final decisions are subject to mandatory
review by the Federal Circuit.' The Federal Circuit, however,
377. See infra notes 379-468 and accompanying text.
378. See Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting
that under Chevron, reviewing courts must accord substantial deference to agency decisions).
379. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), (b), (g), (h) (1994) (providing exclusive CrTjurisdiction over
certain Customs decisions). The CIT reviews protests regarding appraisement, classification,
duties, and similar decisions by Customs. Id § 1581(a), (h). In addition, the CIT reviews
decisions by the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke or deny customs broker licenses. Id.
§ 1581(g). Finally, the CIT hears cases brought by the United States to recover civil penalties
or bonds relating to imported merchandise. I. § 1582. See also id. § 1583 (regarding
counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party actions).
380. See id. § 1295(a) (5) (providing that Federal Circuit "shall have exclusivejurisdiction...
of an appeal from afinal decision of the United States Court of International Trade" and not
mentioning any provision for discretionary review of final decisions) (emphasis added). By
means of comparison, U.S. law explicitly provides that when a CIT judge issues an interlocutory
order, the Federal Circuit "may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order,"
provided that the CIT judge certifies the appeal with an accompanying statement that "a
controlling question of law is involved with respect to which there is a substantial ground for
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applies a standard of review in customs cases that is different from the
standard applied in Title VII cases.
In most customs cases, pursuant to a statutorily specified standard
of review, the CIT renders a decision based on the record made
before that court.1t  To that record and decision by the CIT, the
Federal Circuit freely applies the same traditional standards of review
that the Federal Circuit applies in other cases appealed from a district
court.t82 Congress also has specified a standard of review for the
CIT in Title VII cases, but that standard is based entirely on a pre-
existing record, rather than a record established at trial before the
CIT."a With Title VII cases, a peculiar result is achieved in that the
Federal Circuit has imposed upon itself a constraint whereby, rather
than relying on the traditional standards of review that would be
available to it, the court applies the standards that Congress has
instructed the CIT to use. This practice leads to the seemingly
incongruous result that the appellate court treats decisions of the
same court in a significantly disparate manner.
Customs classification cases, which represent the bulk of customs
cases before the Federal Circuit, like patent cases, can present both
issues of law and fact. The meaning of a tariff classification term is
a question of law, which the Federal Circuit theoretically reviews de
novo.1 The determination whether the merchandise in question
comes within a particular tariff provision, as properly interpreted, is
a question of fact.' Questions of fact are not reviewed de novo,
but are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 6 Classifica-
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation." I& § 1292(d) (1).
381. Id § 2640(a) (1), (2) (providing for CIT review on basis of CIT record in customs cases
involving denial of protests and denial of petitions by interested parties concerning classification
and rate of duty). But see id. § 2640(d) (providing that in cases involving Customs' accreditation
of private testing laboratories, CIT review shall be made on basis of record before Customs at
time of administrative decision or order).
382. See, e.g., Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(reviewing de novo question of law in customs classification case); F.F. Zuniga a/c Refractorios
Monterrey, SA v. United States, 966 F.2d 1203, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (declaring that factual
findings by CIT in customs case will be upheld unless clearly erroneous); Hoechst
Aktiengeselschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reviewing de novo question of
law); Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reviewing
factual finding by district court for clear error).
383. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b) (providing that in CIT cases commenced under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a, CIT shall review case in manner specified in that section); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1994)
(specifying "substantial evidence on the record" standard and defining record for review).
384. Totes, Inc. v. United States, 69 F.3d 495, 497-98 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Mita Copystar
Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
385. Id (citing Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1054, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
386. Nidec Corp. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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don cases are best understood, however, if the full process is briefly
described.
Customs classification cases go through several steps. First, Customs
classifies the relevant imported merchandise under a particular
subheading of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
("HTS"). An importer dissatisfied with such a classification can
protest Customs' classification by following certain statutory proce-
dures.' 7 If Customs denies the protest, then the importer can file
an appeal with the CIT.' At the CIT, the party challenging
Customs' classification must establish that Customs' classification is in
error. 9  If the party meets this burden, the CIT must find the
correct result "by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at
hand.""g The CIT renders a decision on the basis of the record
made before the court.391 The CIT may decide a classification issue
after a trial, 92 by stipulation of facts by the parties,393 by judgment
on the pleadings" or based on a motion for summary judg-
ment.95
Where the CIT holds a trial to resolve the factual aspects of a tariff
classification issue, it is the CIT's decision that the Federal Circuit
reviews."' Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2639 (a) (1), the factual basis for
Customs' classification determinations are presumed to be cor-
rect.39 Therefore, the appellant challenging a classification bears
the burden of proof before the CIT.93 Once the CIT reaches a
387. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-1515 (specifying Customs protest and review procedures).
388. See id. § 1514(a) (stipulating that certain Customs decisions are final and conclusive,
unless valid protest is filed, or unless action is filed in CIT contesting denial of protest).
389. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. United States, 869 F. Supp. 974, 979 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994)
(indicating that CIT conducts de novo review to ensure that "correct resui' was reached).
390. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The CIT is
required to determine the correct result, and will decide the classification itself, or may, in its
discretion, remand the case to Customs. Id. at 880.
391. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (1994).
392. See Cr. INT'L TRADE R. 40(a) (providing generally for request for trial).
393. See CT. INT'L TRADE R. 58.1 (providing generally for stipulated judgment on agreed
facts).
394. See Cr. INT'L TRADE R. 12(c) (providing generally for motion for judgment on
pleadings).
395. See CT. INT'L TRADE R. 56 (providing generally for motion for summary judgment).
Challenges to Customs' appraisal and valuation decisions work in substantially the same manner
as challenges to classification decisions. See generally THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, A HisTORY 1982-1990, at 332-33 (1991).
396. SeeNidec Corp. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing "clearly
error" standard in reference to fact-fiding of CIT trial judge).
397. Totes, Inc. v. United States, 69 F.3d 495, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2639(a)(1) (1988)).
398. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2639 (a) (1) (1988)); Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d
1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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decision, however, the Federal Circuit reviews the findings of the CIT
under the clearly erroneous standard.
Although the clearly erroneous standard is typically less deferential
to the trier-of-fact than the substantial evidence standard, this
distinction is strikingly less apparent in Title VII and customs cases.
As noted above, under the substantial evidence standard as reapplied
by the Federal Circuit in Title VII cases, the court may not substitute
its finding for another reasonable one made by the agency3s The
Federal Circuit similarly has stated:
[The clearly erroneous standard] plainly does not entitle a
reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply
because it is convinced that it would have decided the case
differently .... If the district court's account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of
appeals may not reverse it.1°
Thus, as applied by the Federal Circuit, the clearly erroneous
standard accords a fair amount of deference to the decision below.
This is noteworthy because in customs cases, the CIT acts as its own
trier-of-fact, whereas in Title VII cases, the CIT reviews and filters the
evidence presented to the agency. Hence, in customs cases, the
Federal Circuit accords some deference to the CIT and does not
review Customs' determination "anew." In contrast, in Title VII cases,
little deference is afforded to the CIT and another substantial
evidence review of the agency's findings is conducted.
While it may not conduct its own trial, the CIT is not any less
expert in Title VII proceedings than it is in customs cases. Moreover,
the CIT presumably is as adept at applying a statutory standard of
review in Title VII cases as it is at performing the functions of a trial
court in customs cases. Indeed, it is difficult to explain why, when the
Federal Circuit conducts its review, the CIT's decisions in Title VII
cases should be treated as though they do not exist, while accorded
deference in customs cases. In both types of cases, it is the CIT's
decision that should be reviewed. The agency's decision should be
used only as necessary to determine whether the CIT erred.
399. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text (explaining substantial evidence test).
400. SuperiorWire v. United States, 867 F.2d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quotingAnderson
v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)); see also F.F. Zuniga v. United States, 996
F.2d 1203, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying clearly erroneous standard to review CIT's finding
upholding Customs' denial of duty-free status for imported kiln furniture). Professors Childress
and Davis state that "[u]nder clearly erroneous review, a court may in a sense substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court, even on findings that are not unreasonable." Childress &
Davis, supra note 21, § 15.03, at 15-17. This last statement does not appear consistent with the
Federal Circuit's review of the CIT's fact-finding in customs cases.
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Furthermore, as discussed below, even under the de novo standard of
review applied to questions of law in customs cases, the Federal
Circuit seems to accord some deference to the CIT.
Where the question presented is the interpretation of statutory
language contained in the laws administered by Customs, the Federal
Circuit reviews de novo, inasmuch as such a review entails a question
of law."° In so doing, however, the Federal Circuit determines
whether the initial Customs decision is based on a permissible
construction of the trade statutes. °2 Moreover, where the court is
construing an ambiguous statute, it has recognized that a reasonable
interpretation by the agency that implements it is entitled to
deference. 3  Nevertheless, the agency's interpretation must be
reasonable. Thus, even where the CIT has upheld Customs' statutory
interpretation, if the Federal Circuit disagrees because, for example,
the substantive effect of such an interpretation is inconsistent with the
rest of the relevant law, the appellate court will reverse.40 4
The Federal Circuit also reviews challenges to regulations promul-
gated by Customs. Such challenges are initially decided by the CIT,
with a right of appeal to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit
then reviews the CIT's interpretation of the relevant statutes and
401. Regiomontana v. United States, 64 F.3d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Aviall of
Texas, Inc. v. United States, 70 F.3d 1248, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reviewing de novo Customs'
failure to renew importer's blanket certification based on meaning of term "inadvertence" as
used in 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c) (1)); Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505, 508 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (applying de novo standard of review to CIT's affirmance of Customs' statutory
interpretation of Foreign Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81c (1994), which is administered by
Customs (citing Guess? Inc. v. United States, 944 F.2d 855, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1991))); Superior Wire,
867 F.2d at 1411-12 (stating that while Federal Circuit must review trial court's findings of fact
under clearly erroneous standard, it is not so restricted with respect to legal conclusions and will
reverse conclusions on lesser grounds).
402. Goodman Mfg., 69 F.3d at 508 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
403. Id. at 510 (citing Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232, 1236 (1995);
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). Chevron deference, however, may not apply to Customs'
interpretation of the HTS in routine classification cases. See, e.g., Crystal Clear Indus. v. United
States, 44 F.3d 1001, 1003 n.* (Fed. Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Anval Nyby Powder AB v. United
States, 927 F. Supp. 463, 467-69 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). Deference to agency interpretations of
a statute that it is charged with administering should not be confused with the statutory
presumption of correctness that attaches to the factual aspects of agency action. See Goodman
Mfg., 69 F.3d at 508 (distinguishing these two concepts). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a) (1) (1994),
this presumption is applicable to actions commenced under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1515,1516, and 1516a.
Goodman Mfg., 69 F.3d at 508.
404. See Goodman Mfg., 69 F.3d at 510, 512 (disagreeing with interpretation of CIT when CIT
deferred to Customs' method of calculating allowance for steel scrap).
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regulations de novo,4 5 but applies Chevron deference to Customs'
interpretation of the statute. 6
Although there is a semantic difference between the de novo and
in-accordance-with-law standards (the latter of which is applied in
Title VII cases), it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit in practice
views its role differently under one or the other standard. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit's application of these two standards in internation-
al trade and customs cases appears to be very similar. °7 Rather,
what seems to vary is the degree to which the appellate court focuses
on the decision of the CIT (versus that of the agency).
In conducting a recent so-called de novo review of a CIT grant of
summary judgment in favor of the government in a classification case,
the Federal Circuit's analysis started far from the tabula rasa that one
would expect in a de novo review.' In Totes, Inc. v. United
States, 9 the court devoted a good portion of its opinion to the
holding and reasoning of the CIT and to the issue of whether the
lower court erred.41° In fact, the Federal Circuit concluded by
stating, "The Court of International Trade correctly interpreted the
HTSUS in determining that the merchandise is properly classified
under subheading 4202.92.9020, HTSUS, and is not classifiable under
subheading 8708.99.50, HTSUS."411 This decision thus highlights
the Federal Circuit's recognition of the expertise of the CIT, even as
to questions of legal interpretation, in the area of customs law.
Increasingly, the Federal Circuit seems to be focusing on the decisions
of the CIT, rather than the underlying agency action or determina-
tion, and reviewing the lower court's decision.
Such an approach is consistent with both Chevron and the standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in NLRB cases. That is, the
appellate court should determine whether the lower court misappre-
405. Target Sportswear, Inc. v. United States, 70 F.Sd 604, 606 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
406. National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 59 F.3d
1219, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
407. See e.g., Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 85 F.3d 1561,1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining
that in Title VII cases, "[miatters of statutory interpretation receive plenary review on appeal,"
subject to Chevron deference to agency); Guess? Inc. v. United States, 944 F.2d 855, 857-58 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (noting that in customs cases, court decides "de novo the proper interpretation of
the governing statute and regulations" also subject to Chevron deference to agency).
408. A ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment is a question of law and thus is subject to
de novo review. Goodman Mfg., 69 F.3d at 508; Totes, Inc. v. United States, 69 F.3d 495, 497-98
(Fed. Cir. 1995). The granting by the CIT of a motion to dismiss a case (challenging Customs'
liquidation) for lack ofjurisdiction also is reviewed de novo by the Federal Circuit as a matter
of law. Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
409. 69 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
410. Totes, Inc., 69 F.3d at 497-500.
411. Id at 500.
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hended or misapplied the standard of review, which subsumes the
question of whether the lower court properly accorded Chevron
deference as to certain legal issues.412 In essence, then, in only
limited circumstances would the appellate court need to conduct true
de novo review of a legal question. Indeed, while issues of law are
uniformly reviewed by the courts of appeal on a de novo basis, a
legitimate question might arise as to the necessity of two tiers of
virtually identical review in such cases. Thus, through case law, the de
novo standard has evolved into a hybrid whereby deference is
accorded to the agency in many instances, and the lower court's
decision is not necessarily ignored."
The Federal Circuit's apparent different treatment of the CIT's
legal analysis in customs cases and Title VII cases is inexplicable. The
CIT reviews both Customs and the ITC and DOG for the reasonable-
ness of their statutory interpretations under Chevron deference. It
appears, however, that the Federal Circuit's de novo review in customs
cases relies more heavily on the CIT's analysis than it does in Title VII
cases. Given that the CIT's expertise and function in both customs
and AD and CVD cases are virtually identical, this result truly is
anomalous.
B. Other Cases in the Federal Circuit's Jurisdiction
In addition to patent and international trade/customs appeals, the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over several other areas of
412. See Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-
45 (1984).
413. Congress' statutory prescription ofthe standard of review to be applied in veterans cases
tends to support a distinction between true de novo review, where the Federal Circuit decides
for itself a question of law, versus the court's setting aside agency regulations or interpretations
thereof that are not in accordance with law. See Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1251
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Legal interpretations of a statute by the Court of Veterans Appeals are
reviewed by the Federal Circuit de novo. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1994) (specifying that
"the Federal Circuit shall deride all relevant questions of law") (emphasis added); Prenzler v.
Denvinski, 928 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (asserting that de novo is correct standard of
review for appeals from Veterans Court and that Federal Circuit can set aside decisions that are
unconstitutional, violative of statute, or arbitrary). Regulations "issued pursuant to a statutory
grant of authority relating to an agency's practice under a statute which it is charged to
implement are of legislative effect and must be given controlling weight by the court unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Travelstead, 978 F.2d at 1250
(citing Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977)). Notably, the Federal Circuit has
inserted the modifier "manifesty," whereas the statute simply states "not in accordance with law"
and "in excess of statutory... authority." See id Hence, the court may be according even more
deference to the agency than Congress intended. "In contrast, agency pronouncements that are
merely interpretive are given lesser deference, varying with such factors as the timing and
consistency of the agency's position and the nature of its expertise." Id. (citing General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
As such, for veterans appeals, the Chevron doctrine effectively seems to have been codified.
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law. These include appeals from certain specialty courts, specifically,
appeals from final decisions of the United States Court of Federal
Claims 14 and the Court of Veterans Appeals. 1  The Federal
Circuit also hears appeals of final orders/decisions made by the
MSPB416 and agency boards of contract appeals.417 Lastly, actions
brought under certain enumerated provisions of the U.S. Code are
also included in the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction.418
1. Boards of Contract Appeals
Federal agencies have the ability to create boards of contract
appeals to review the award of contracts to various vendors. Appeals
from such board decisions are vested exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Circuit.419 The standard of review applied by the
Federal Circuit is governed by statute:
In the event of an appeal by a contractor or the Government from
a decision of any agency board pursuant to section 607 of this title,
notwithstanding any contract provision, regulation, or rules of law
to the contrary, the decision of the agency board on any question
of law shall not be final or conclusive, but the decision on any
question of fact shall be final and conclusive and shall not be set
aside unless the decision is fraudulent, or arbitrary, or capricious,
or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or if such
decision is not supported by substantial evidence.420
In the case of appeals from agency boards of contract appeals, just
as with appeals from Title VII decisions, the statutorily prescribed
standard of review includes both the substantial evidence test and the
arbitrary and capricious test. Unlike with Title VII cases, however, the
statute dictates that the Federal Circuit apply these two tests.
42
'
Moreover, the statute directs the Federal Circuit to apply these tests
to the contract board's decision and not to the initial agency
414. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (3) (1994).
415. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(b)(1).
416. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
417. Id § 1295(a) (10) (providing for appeal of agency board of contract appeals decisions
under § 8(g) (1) of Contract Disputes Act of 1978).
418. See id. § 1295(a) (1), (2) (providingforappeal under Little TuckerAct); id. § 1295(a) (8)
(providing for appeal under Plant Variety Protection Act); id. § 1295(a)(11) (providing for
appeal under § 211 of Economic Stabilization Act of 1970); id. § 1295(a)(12) (providing for
appeal under § 5 of Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973); id& § 1295(a) (13) (providing
for appeal under § 506(c) of Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978); id § 1295(a)(14) (providing for
appeal under § 523 of Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
419. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10).
420. 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1994).
421. Id.; Milmark Servs., Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 855, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Erickson
Air Crane Co. of Washington Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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action. 2 Hence, just as with other types of cases discussed above,
Congress has specifically spoken to the Federal Circuit's standard of
review, in contrast to its silence in Title VII cases.
Also, as with MSPB cases, the agency contract boards effectively
conduct trials. In rendering their decisions, contract boards use a de
novo standard as to questions of law and a preponderance of the
evidence standard as to questions of fact (i.e., just like a district court
civil case).4
Furthermore, because the contract board is part of the same agency
that makes the initial decision being reviewed by the board, it seems
that such cases effectively involve only a single tier of true review,
performed by the Federal Circuit. As such, the redundancy present
in review of Title VII cases does not exist with regard to contract
board cases. The absence of an intermediate tier ofjudicial review in
these types of cases, however, does not lend support to the suggestion
that CIT review be eliminated. The nature of the "decision"
challenged in contract board cases is agency action-rather than
agency decision-making-taken at an operational level. Thus, while
some judicial scrutiny of such action is advisable, it would seem to be
unnecessary to interpose another layer ofjudicial review here. Title
VII decision-making, by contrast, is not part of the ITC's or the DOC's
operational activities. This distinction is pivotal to the question of
how much judicial review is appropriate. Moreover, even though part
of the same agency, the contract board of appeals nevertheless acts in
a reviewing capacity. In contrast, there is no appellate board that
reviews the ITC and the DOC in Title VII proceedings, and as
discussed previously, it would make no sense to create one in lieu of
the institutional expertise of the CIT.424
Also, notably, as to questions of law, a contract board's decision is
not considered final.4" Thus, it seems that somewhat less deference
is accorded to the decisions of agency boards of contract appeals than
to those of the CIT.42 Such a result is not illogical, given that the
intermediate appellate decision-making body which the Federal
Circuit reviews in contract board cases is part of the same agency that
made the initial decision subject to the intermediate appeal. This is
not the situation in Title VII cases, where the intermediate decision-
422. 41 U.S.C. § 609(b).
423. Protest of Lanier Business Prods., Inc., 85-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 18,033 (1995); LA Sys. v.
Department of Commerce, 95-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,822 (1994); Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v.
Department of the Air Force, 93-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 25,776 (1992).
424. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text (discussing expertise of CIT).
425. 41 U.S.C. § 609(b).
426. Id.
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making body is an Article III court.427 Hence, even more deference
should be accorded the CIT.
428
Indeed, it appears that Congress did in fact accord more deference
to the CIT. With regard to Federal Circuit review of Title VII cases,
the statute is silent as to whether the court should review the
underlying agency action or the decision of the CIT and as to what
standard of review the Federal Circuit should apply, thus permitting
the Federal Circuit to apply a different standard than set forth at 19
U.S.C. § 1516a, deferring more to the expertise of the CIT. Thus, it
would be appropriate for the Federal Circuit to exercise the freedom
in review that Congress apparently intended.
2. United States Court of Federal Claims
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from
the United States Court of Federal Claims.429 The Court of Federal
Claims' primary realm of jurisdiction is embodied in the Tucker
Act 4 ° The statute provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction
to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.4"'
The Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over these
matters if the claim at issue exceeds ten thousand dollars. 43 2  The
427. Article III courts are structurally more independent than their legislative counterparts
(Article I courts) or executive branch departments or agencies. This is due to: (1) the life
tenure afforded Article III judges; (2) Article III courts not being connected to any particular
government agency; (3) Article III courts having their jurisdiction largely defined by the
Constitution; and (4) the limitation on reductions in salaries of active Article IlI judges. Due
to this greater degree of independence, it is generally assumed that the decisions of an Article
III court are less likely to be affected by political agendas or the majority position of the
populace on a given issue or at a particular time. See Justice Stevens Citicies Election ofJudges,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at A14 (presenting comments of Justice John Paul Stevens to
American Bar Association describing election ofjudges as "a practice that.., is comparable to
allowing football fans to elect the referees"). This perception of independence would
presumably affect the manner in which a lower tribunal's decision should be reviewed, i.e., it
would be appropriate to give greater deference to a decision rendered by an Article III court
than by a legislative court.
428. See 28 U.S.C. § 2645(c) (1994) (stating that decision of CIT is final and conclusive
unless retried, reheard, or appealed to Federal Circuit).
429. Id. § 1295(a)(3).
430. Id § 1491. The Court of Federal Claims also shares concurrentjurisdiction with district
courts in tax refund cases. See id. § 1846(a) (1).
431. Id. § 1491(a) (1).
432. See id. § 1346(a) (2) (stating that for claims not exceeding $10,000, Claims Court shares
original jurisdiction with district courts).
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court's primary jurisdiction is over claims for monetary damages; it
cannot hear cases in which specific performance or other equitable
relief is requested as a remedy."3
The standard of review applicable to appeals from the Court of
Federal Claims is not defined by statute." Thus, the review stan-
dards have developed through case law decisions. The Federal Circuit
reviews matters of law de novo.4 5 With respect to findings of fact
by the Claims Court, the Federal Circuit has held that the appropriate
standard is "clearly erroneous.""6 This is the same standard applied
to appeals from trials in district courts."3 By contrast, in Bosco v.
United States,' the Federal Circuit held that where it is not review-
ing findings of fact made by the Claims Court, but rather is reviewing
the lower court's review of another body's findings of fact, the Federal
Circuit views the issue as a question of law, thereby apparently subject
to so-called de novo review. 439 In essence, this means reapplication
of the standard of review applied by the Claims Court.' 0
Notably, in support of this rationale, the Federal Circuit in Bosco
cited to Atlantic Sugar and its progeny, despite the fact that the court
in Atlantic Sugar never discussed this issue, stating only that it would
433. Yeskoo v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 720, 731 (1996); Calhoun v. United States, 32 Fed.
Cl. 400, 406 (1994).
434. Milmark Serv., Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 855, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
435. SeeApplegate v. United States, 25 F.3d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("This court reviews
de novo decisions of the Court of Federal Claims on matters of law and reviews for clear error
findings of fact." (citingYancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); see also
Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reviewing Claims Court
grant of summary judgment under de novo standard, with justifiable factual inferences being
drawn in favor of party opposing summaryjudgment).
436. Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
437. Id. at 1158.
438. 931 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
439. See Bosco v. United States, 931 F.2d 879, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that determina-
tion of whether Claims Court correctly held that IRS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
reclassifying certain jobs, and that IRS decision was supported by substantial evidence, was
question of law, subject to de novo review). The Bosco panel included CircuitJudges Michel,
Plager and Smith; Circuit Judge Michel authored the opinion. See also Hines v. Secretary of
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1522-23 (Fed. Cir. 1991). There appears to
have been some split among the Federal Circuitjudges as to whether so-called de novo review
was required or advisable. The majority opinions, however, seem to support this proposition.
See Marlene K. Tandy, Federal Circuit Review of Vaccine Compensation Cases Under the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: 1990-1995, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 29, 35 (1995) (asserting that any split
appears to have "settled oue'). But see McClendon v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 93-5106, 1994 WL 660806, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 23, 1994) (Rader, J. dissenting)
(criticizing standard applied by majority as "blatant reweighing of the facts"). Given this historic
split, it also would follow that there might exist differences of opinion regarding the merits of
the Atlantic Sugar rule as applied to Title VII cases.
440. Bosco, 931 F.2d at 882; see also Pender Peanut Corp. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 447, 451
(1990) (stating that when Claims Court reviews agency action, it applies review standards set
forth in APA).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSr[Y LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1749
apply anew the statutory standard." The Bosco decision itself also
does not adequately clarify how review by the Federal Circuit of the
Claims Court's application of the relevant standards of review to an
IRS decision is a question of law subject to so-called de novo
review-it merely states the proposition.' Another Federal Circuit
decision, Hines v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Servic-
es,' 3 following and citing Bosco, expands upon this question.
444
The Hines decision also permits us to trace a likely origin of the
Atlantic Sugar standard. In Hines, the Federal Circuit was presented
with a case of first impression as a result of a change in the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act ("Vaccine Act").' 4  Prior to the
statutory change, in Vaccine Act cases, the Claims Court reviewed de
novo the proposed findings and legal conclusions of a special master.
In any subsequent appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims
Court's decision for correctness in questions of law and for clear error
in findings of fact. In 1989, Congress amended the Vaccine Act so
that the special master's findings and conclusions were no longer
merely proposed findings and conclusions. Further, under the
amended law, the Claims Court was not permitted to set aside a
special master's findings or conclusions unless it determined them to
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law." Thus, the Federal Circuit felt that a new
issue was presented, namely, given the amended statutory framework,
under what standard should it review the Claims Court's decision.
44 7
To analyze this issue, the Federal Circuit examined what it viewed
to be "analogous situations."'3 Specifically, the court cited Bosco,
Atlantic Sugar and its progeny, and the court's decision in Milliken
441. Bosco, 931 F.2d at 882. The court in Bosco cited the following as support for the
standard it was applying.
American Permac v. United States, 831 F.2d 269, 273 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
485 U.S. 901 (1988) (in reviewing CIT's review oflTC determination, this court reviews
the underlying ITC decision); Atlantic Sugar v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("We review that court's [Court of International Trade's] review of an
rrC determination by applying anew the statute's express judicial review standard.").
Id.
442. See id. at 882, 883.
443. 940 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
444. Hines v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1523-24 (Fed. Cir.
1991). The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Michel and Lourie, and Senior Circuit Judge
Skelton; Circuit Judge Michel authored the opinion.
445. 42 U.S.C. § 30Oaa-1 to -34 (1994).
446. Id. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B).
447. Hines, 940 F.2d at 1522.
448. Id. at 1523.
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Research Corp. v. Dan Rive, Inc. 9  Because Bosco relies on Atlantic
Sugar and Atlantic Sugar does not explain the basis for the "apply
anew" standard, we must look to Milliken for meaningful guidance.
Milliken, however, does not hold that the Federal Circuit should
apply de novo review to the initial findings and conclusions of the
special master, reapplying the same standard of review previously
applied." ° To the contrary, the court in Milliken clearly stated that
it would not ignore the decision of the district court. The difficulty
and confusion seem to lie in a connection that subsequent decisions
have made, based on a single phrase used in Milliken, but which is a
connection that the Milliken court itself expressly refused to make.1
In Milliken, the Federal Circuit had before it a decision of a district
court in a patent case wherein the district court had set aside findings
of fact in a special master's report, based on a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review. 52 At issue was whether Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits findings of fact from
being overturned unless clearly erroneous, also controlled Federal
Circuit review."13 The Federal Circuit explained that "the decision of
the district court holding a finding of fact by the master clearly
erroneous is not itself a 'finding of fact.""'4 4 Therefore, the Federal
Circuit found that, as to the district court's decision to set aside the
special master's findings, the clearly erroneous standard was inapplica-
ble.5 5 The question of the propriety of the district court's setting
aside of the special master's findings, the Federal Circuit concluded,
was to be reviewed as "a matter of law."4"6 It is the use of this
phrase by the court in Milliken that has resulted in some confusion.
The court in Milliken never stated that its use of the term "matter
of law" meant that wholesale so-called de novo review of the special
449. 739 F.2d 587 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Miliiken opinion was authored by the late Circuit
Judge Nies, who was joined by Senior CircuitJudge Kellam (E.D. Va.), sitting by designation.
Also on the panel, but dissenting, was CircuitJudge Smith.
450. Milliken Research Corp. v. Dan River, Inc., 739 F.2d 587, 592-93 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
451. In essence, the Bosco and Hines courts seem to have reasoned that, if a=b and b=c, then
a=c, without testing the resultant conclusion for consistency with the Mi/!iken holding, which was
that a-c.
452. Milliken, 739 F.2d at 589.
453. Id at 592-93.
454. Id.
455. See id. Although holding a finding of fact by the master clearly erroneous is in itself not
controlled by Rule 52(a), any substitute findings made by the district court would be reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard, as would be any findings of the special master which were
adopted by the district court. Id
456. I& at 593.
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master's decision would occur. 7  In fact, the court in Milliken
stated and acted to the contrary. The court wrote:
Milliken would have us review the master's report directly; [appel-
lee] Dan River would have us review the district court only. We
conclude that the position of neither party correctly defines the
role of this court.
Milliken.. . would have us wholly ignore the role of the district
court in the appellate process. We cannot agree with this alterna-
tive position.458
The court went on to consider carefully the district court's rationale
and findings and conclusions, with reference to the special master's
report as appropriate, ultimately affirming the district court.' 9
In light of the Milliken court's explicit teachings on the role of the
district court, one can infer the meaning of its statement regarding
its review of the district court as being "a matter of law." In essence,
the Federal Circuit looked to see whether the district court correctly
applied the standard of review. While this is a legal question, it is not
one that necessarily entails true de novo review, or "so-called" de novo
review whereby the appellate court effectively goes back to the
drawing board to review the findings of the initial decision-maker.
Indeed, the legal question is more akin to that posed by the Supreme
Court in NLRB cases, namely, the issue of whether the intermediate
reviewing body, in applying the standard of review, misapprehended
or grossly misapplied that standard." ° Moreover, irrespective of the
Milliken court's choice of the term "matter of law," it is clear that the
court did not support ignoring the decision of the district court and
going back to the decision of the special master. Thus, the Hines
citation to Milliken for the proposition that "we review the underlying
decision of the special master under the [original statutory standard
of review]" is inconsistent with the actual holding of Milliken, and with
the deference therein accorded to the district court.
461
Thus, the puzzle seems to be missing a piece-how did the Federal
Circuit get from Milliken to Hines? As set forth above, Atlantic Sugar
457. See Bradley v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 991 F.2d 1570, 1576-78
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (Plager, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that term "legal"
conclusion does not always mean that issue decided was matter of law entitled to de novo
review).
458. Miiken, 739 F.2d at 592.
459. 1& at 602.
460. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's "hands off"
approach in NLRB cases).
461. Hines v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1524 (Fed. Cir.
1991). Indeed, nowhere in the entire MilUhike decision did the court apply the clearly erroneous
standard to the findings of the special master.
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and Bosco were decided between these decisions. Because Bosco cites
to Atlantic Sugar, Atlantic Sugar may well be the missing link.
Significantly, CircuitJudge Smith, who dissented in Milliken (although
not addressing the standard of review in his dissent), authored the
Atlantic Sugar opinion only a few months later."' This hardly seems
a coincidence. A possible explanation is thatJudge Smith disagreed
with the Milliken decision on the standard of review issue as well, but
simply did not address it in his dissent in that case.
Such an explanation is quite plausible, given Judge Smith's
agreement with the special master and disagreement with the district
court. Thus, he likely would have preferred a "review anew"
approach. Moreover, the majority in Milliken acknowledged that the
other circuits were divided on the issue of appellate review of a
district court rejection of a special master's findings.4 a Further,
because Title VII cases are quite different from the issue in Milliken,
presumably Judge Smith and the panel in Atlantic Sugar would not
have felt bound by Milliken.
464
In any event, whatever the reason for Atlantic Sugar, this Article
submits that the actual approach in Milliken would be the better route
for the Federal Circuit to follow in Title VII cases. Scholars have
praised the Milliken decision as a very reasoned approach to the
question of how to handle review of a review." It seems that the
Federal Circuit in Milliken appropriately focused on the question of
whether the district court acted improperly. In fact, the Milliken
approach is not dissimilar from that advocated by the Federal Circuitin Surarerica f~4 66 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit can adopt such
an approach in Title VII cases without necessarily addressing whether
the same result should obtain for Claims Court appeals-the other
462. Milliken was decided on July 5, 1984 and Atlantic Sugar, on September 25, 1985.
463. Milliken, 739 F.2d at 592. According to the court, the majority relied on decisions of
the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits and Dan River, on the
Fourth, Fifth and Eighth. Id.
464. That the court would not have felt bound by Milliken is somewhat difficult to reconcile
in light of subsequent citations to Atlantic Sugar. Specifically, the Hines court cited to Atlantic
Sugar in support of its application of the apply anew standard to the finding of a special master.
Hence, the court would seem to have come full circle.
465. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 21, § 2.03, at 2-15 to 2-16 (describing Milliken as
"thoughtful" examination of two-tier review issue and recognizing that Federal Circuit has
identified "the problem and framed the inquiry in a way often skimmed over in previous
considerations").
466. See Suramerica I, 44 F.3d at 983 n.1. The Suramerica II court suggests that its review
should be limited to determining whether the CIT misapprehended or grossly misapplied the
statutory standard, thus exhibiting an approach similar to that in Miliken through a focus on
the review conducted by the lower court, as opposed to direct review of the fact-finder or
agency.
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area to which the Atlantic Sugar rule has been extended.467 Given
the unique and exclusive expertise of the CIT, however, there is
ample reason to distinguish Tide VII cases from Claims Court
appeals."i In fact, the controversy that application of the Atlantic
Sugar rule has engendered in Vaccine Act cases strengthens the
argument that the rule be abandoned.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in this Article, while the standard of review
currently articulated by the Federal Circuit in Title VII cases is not
absolutely unique, it is aberrational when compared to other types of
cases within the court's jurisdiction. The Surarica Ilpanel properly
recognized that the court is not required to apply any particular
standard of review in Title VII cases.469 As such, the Federal Circuit
has the freedom to craft a suitable standard. The Federal Circuit's
standard should reflect the value of the reviewing function already
performed by the CIT. The agency decision being reviewed results
from informal adjudication, albeit on an administrative record. The
CIT, which has reviewed that record and decision pursuant to a
statutorily prescribed standard of review, is an Article III court of
specialized expertise. Obviously, if the CIT has misapprehended or
grossly misapplied the statutory standard of review, the Federal Circuit
should correct the lower court. Absent such error, however, the
Federal Circuit can determine how much deference to accord the
CIT's decision, rather than revisit wholesale the agency determination
and reapply the original standard of review.
Indeed, various policy considerations suggest that the Suramerica II
panel's alternative approach is more sound than the redundant
application of the same standard of review by two federal courts.
First, following the Suramerica II approach would result in more
limited review of CIT decisions, fostering the conservation ofjudicial
resources. This approach would lessen, rather than increase, the
Federal Circuit's burden because parties presumably would consider
an appeal to the Federal Circuit more closely if review were limited
467. One significant distinction that seems to have caused difficulty in Claims Court appeals
is the fact that the Claims Court can make its own findings or adopt those of the special master.
As a rule, the CIT can do neither in Title VII cases-it can only decide whether the agency
findings were correct (under the applicable standard of review), based on the administrative
record (or remand to the agency for further findings).
468. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text (discussing expertise and unique role of
CIT). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court and
not an Article III court like the CIT. See supra note 427.
469. See supra notes 156-78 and accompanying text (analyzing Surameica II decision).
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to an examination of the CIT's application of the standard of review.
Second, the Suramerica 11 approach places the Federal Circuit in the
sound position of ensuring that the CIT has appropriately applied
Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute. This
is an appropriate role for the Federal Circuit. By considering the
opinion of the CIT, in light of that court's statutory review standard,
the Federal Circuit would rely upon the decisions of expert agencies
and a court to which Congress specifically delegated certain interna-
tional trade functions. However, particularly when the agency and
CIT disagree, the Federal Circuit would also provide a necessary
examination of the CIT's analysis. Those who are regularly affected
by decisions of the ITC, DOC, and CIT are best served by speedy,
efficient, consistent, and expert judgments. Federal Circuit review
that does not broadly reapply the CIT's review standard would ensure
that these objectives are met.
